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MIRRORED HARMS: UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES IN 





Rates of domestic violence are astonishingly high in Indian Country. 
More than half of Indian women have experienced physical violence in 
their lifetimes. They are twice as likely to experience rape as white women
 
and to experience more violent rape when it occurs. Their plight is also 
deeply intertwined with race: 90% of women reported that the intimate 
partner violence they experienced was at the hands of a non-Indian 
perpetrator. At the same time, tribes are largely unable to address this 
problem through their criminal laws due to the centuries-long erosion of 
tribal sovereignty. In the 1977 case of Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, the 
Supreme Court held that tribes had no inherent authority to prosecute non-
Indians for crimes committed on Indian land.
 
This departure from 
commonly understood tribal sovereignty principles created a vacuum that 
disproportionately affected Indian victims of domestic violence. Non-
Indians could act with virtual impunity, immune from prosecution by the 
tribe and, usually, the state. Meanwhile, the federal government, which 
retained criminal jurisdiction, declined to prosecute an astonishing two-
thirds of sexual violence cases and nearly half of assault crimes. In 
response to these problems, Congress passed Special Domestic Violence 
Criminal Jurisdiction (SDVCJ) in its 2013 reauthorization of the Violence 
Against Women Act. This provision “recognize[s] and affirm[s]” the 
“inherent power” of tribes to exercise criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians, effectively overruling Oliphant with respect to crimes of domestic 
violence. Many tribes and advocacy organizations applauded this 
legislation for its enhancement of tribal sovereignty and for its effort to 
combat the scourge of domestic violence in Indian territory.  
Despite the best intentions of the legislators, however, a number of 
defects in the legislation undermine its goal of protecting Indian victims of 
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domestic violence. In this paper, I argue that SDVCJ creates unintended 
harms mirroring the very harms that the domestic violence movement as a 
whole tries to address. I do not argue that SDVCJ is a net detriment to 
remediating domestic violence or enhancing tribal sovereignty, but that the 
harms present in the current iteration of SDVCJ should concern legislators 
and advocates seeking to actually address domestic violence. In particular, 
I track how limitations on the type of crimes that can be prosecuted—
essentially, only physical assaults—mirror problems from early periods in 
the domestic violence movement, including the perception that only 
physical assaults are sufficiently serious to be worthy of state sanction and 
the failure to recognize domestic violence as an exertion of power and 
control over a victim rather than a series of discrete, isolated incidents. I 
also explore how a perpetrator can manipulate the elements of SDVCJ 
based on his own identity or the identity of the victim—a problem that is 
unique to the intersection of SDVCJ and the political classification and 
racial makeup of Indians on tribal lands—and argue that this, too, mirrors 
existing and prior harms of domestic violence’s interaction with the law. I 
further argue that SDVCJ’s definition of a victim puts the onus on her to 
prove that she is worthy of protection, reflecting the traditional blame 
placed on the woman for failure to prevent her own battering. Finally, I 
discuss some potential solutions, and conclude that SDVCJ should be 
expanded to encompass all crimes committed within a domestic violence 
context and without regard to the identity of perpetrator or victim. 
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Introduction 
There are two truths about modern life on Indian reservations.
1
 The first 
truth is that rates of domestic violence in tribal territory are astonishingly 
high. A total of 55% of Indian women have experienced physical violence,
2
 
compared with 34.5% of women in the United States as a whole.
3
 Indian 
women are 1.2 times more likely than white women to experience violence 
over their lifetime and 1.7 times more likely to experience it in a given 
year.
4
 At a rate of 34%, Indian women are twice as likely to experience rape 
                                                                                                             
 1. As this paper intends to make clear, Indian identity is complex. Throughout this 
paper, I will use the term “tribes” and “tribal” where possible and “Indian” otherwise. 
“Native American” may be interchangeable or preferred in some circles, but there appears to 
be a preference for “Indian” in the legal context. See STEPHEN L. PEVAR, THE RIGHTS OF 
INDIANS AND TRIBES 1 n.* (4th ed. 2012). 
 2. NAT’L CONG. OF AM. INDIANS, VAWA 2013’S SPECIAL DOMESTIC VIOLENCE 
CRIMINAL JURISDICTION (SDVCJ) FIVE-YEAR REPORT 3 (2018) [hereinafter NCAI REPORT], 
http://www.ncai.org/resources/ncai-publications/SDVCJ_5_Year_Report.pdf [https://perma. 
cc/M49A-YCKU]. 
 3. ANDRÉ B. ROSAY, NAT’L INST. OF JUST., NCJ 249736, VIOLENCE AGAINST AMERICAN 
INDIAN AND ALASKA NATIVE WOMEN AND MEN: 2010 FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL 
INTIMATE PARTNER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE SURVEY 44 (2016), https://www.ncjrs.gov/ 
pdffiles1/nij/249736.pdf. 
 4. Id. at 2. 
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 and to experience more violent rape when it occurs.
6
 This 
is also a problem deeply intertwined with race:
7
 90% of women reported 
that the intimate partner violence they experienced was at the hands of a 
non-Indian perpetrator,
8
 while intra-racial rates of sexual violence are 
actually lower among Indian women than among white women.
9
 
The second truth about life on Indian lands is that tribes are largely 
unable to remediate this problem through criminal prosecution. Tribal 
sovereignty, a concept that was recognized well before the founding of the 
United States and has consistently been recognized since the late 1960s, 
provides that unless the federal government says otherwise, tribes have 
complete authority to exercise civil and criminal jurisdiction over persons 
and conduct on Indian land.
10
 But tribes’ ability to govern their own affairs 
has also been constricted for centuries. Congress has attempted to 
assimilate them;
11
 the executive has planned to eradicate them;
12
 and a 
series of Supreme Court decisions has given the federal government plenary 
power over them.
13
 In the context of criminal jurisdiction, the Supreme 
Court limited the tribal sovereignty concept in 1977, where it held, in 
Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, that tribes had no inherent authority to 
prosecute non-Indians for crimes committed on Indian land.
14
 Later, the 
Court extended this holding to Indians who were not members of the 
                                                                                                             
 5. Id. at 11. 
 6. Id. at 14 (showing that rates of forced penetration are twice as high among Indian 
women as among white women). 
 7. In addition to the evidence presented herein, I wish to remark on the lachrymose 
story of Indian women, namely, that pre-colonial Indian women had something more akin to 
gender parity than anything seen in the post-colonial period. See generally Bethany Ruth 
Berger, After Pocahontas: Indian Women and the Law, 1830 to 1934, 21 AM. INDIAN L. REV. 
1 (1997) (discussing the changing role of Indian women in their societies as European 
influence waxed). 
 8. NCAI REPORT, supra note 2, at 3. 
 9. ROSAY, supra note 3, at 19. 
 10. See COHEN’S HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW § 4.01, at 206–22 (Nell Jessup 
Newton et al. eds., 2012) [hereinafter COHEN]; PEVAR, supra note 1, at 81–82 (describing 
tribal jurisdiction); ROBERT T. ANDERSON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: CASES AND 
COMMENTARY 525 (3d ed. 2015) (describing Cohen’s framework). 
 11. See PEVAR, supra note 1, at 7–12. 
 12. Id. at 7–10. 
 13. See id. at 56–58; see also Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 16–17 
(1830) (holding that Indian nations were not “foreign nations” within the meaning of Article 
I of the Constitution); Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553, 565 (1903) (holding that the 
federal government’s power over Indians is “[p]lenary”). 
 14. 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978). 
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 as well as to many civil cases.
16
 This departure from 
commonly understood tribal sovereignty principles created a vacuum that 
disproportionately affected Indian victims of domestic violence. Non-
Indians could commit crimes on Indian land with virtual impunity, as they 
were immune from prosecution by the tribe and, usually, the state.
17
 
Although the federal government retained criminal jurisdiction on Indian 
land, this was cold comfort: two-thirds of sexual violence and 46% of 
assault crimes on tribal reservations went unprosecuted,
18
 despite making 
up more than half of all referred cases.
19
 
In response to these problems, Congress passed Special Domestic 
Violence Criminal Jurisdiction (SDVCJ) in its 2013 reauthorization of the 
Violence Against Women Act.
20
 This provision “recognize[s] and 
affirm[s]” the “inherent power” of tribes to exercise criminal jurisdiction 
over non-Indians,
21
 effectively overruling the Oliphant Court’s analysis of 
tribal sovereignty, but only with respect to crimes of domestic violence.
22
 
Many tribes and advocacy organizations applauded this legislation for its 
enhancement of tribal sovereignty and for its effort to combat the scourge 
of domestic violence in Indian territory. Tribes, which have their own 
constitutions, legislative systems, courts, and criminal codes, can now 
                                                                                                             
 15. See Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 676 (1990), superseded by statute, Department of 
Defense Appropriations Act, 1991, Pub. L. No. 101–511, § 8077(b)–(d), 104 Stat. 1892, 
1892–93; Act of Oct. 28, 1991, Pub. L. No. 102–137, 105 Stat. 646 (codified at 25 U.S.C. 
§ 1301(2)), as recognized in United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193 (2004). 
 16. See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981). 
 17. States generally do not have authority to prosecute for crimes committed in Indian 
territory. In 1953, the federal government passed a controversial law called Public Law 280, 
which authorized six states, somewhat arbitrarily chosen, to exercise criminal jurisdiction. 
That framework is largely in place today. See generally ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 10, at 
408–11 (describing Public Law 280’s background and scope); DUANE CHAMPAGNE & 
CAROLE GOLDBERG, CAPTURED JUSTICE: NATIVE NATIONS AND PUBLIC LAW 280, at 1–25 
(2012); Carole E. Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction over 
Reservation Indians, 22 UCLA L. REV. 535 (1975) (discussing the history of Public Law 
280). For a complete look at what governments may pursue what crimes against whom in 
Indian territory, see CHAMPAGNE & GOLDBERG, supra, at 8–9. 
 18. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-11-167R, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE 
DECLINATIONS OF INDIAN COUNTRY CRIMINAL MATTERS 9, 24 (2010) [hereinafter DOJ 
DECLINATION STATISTICS], http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d11167r.pdf. 
 19. Id. at 9. 
 20. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113–4, § 904, 
127 Stat. 54, 120 (codified at 25 U.S.C. § 1304). 
 21. 25 U.S.C. § 1304(b)(1). 
 22. Id. § 1304(b). 
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voluntarily opt in to prosecuting non-Indians for committing domestic 
violence crimes against Indians.
23
 The tribes themselves define the crime, 
the procedure, and the punishment, so long as they also abide by other 
provisions of federal law.
24
 
Despite the best intentions of the legislators, however, a number of 
defects in the legislation undermine both of its goals—protecting Indian 
victims of domestic violence and enhancing tribal sovereignty. In this 
paper, I focus on the former problem and argue that SDVCJ has created 
unintended harms that mirror the very harms that the domestic violence 
movement as a whole has been trying to address. In particular, because 
SDVCJ limits tribal jurisdiction based on the type of crime and the 
identities of the perpetrator and victim, tribal prosecutors end up with few 
tools to address the plight of domestic violence on their lands.
25
  
I do not argue that SDVCJ is a net detriment to remediating domestic 
violence or tribal sovereignty. Like many new developments, whether in 
law, science, medicine, or technology, the first iteration of an undeniably 
good thing is full of glitches. This paper exposes those glitches in SDVCJ 
and views them through the lens of domestic violence scholarship so that 
legislators are familiar with the defects when they craft new legislation.
26
 
                                                                                                             
 23. See ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 10, at 317–18. Congress has not reauthorized 
VAWA as of the writing of this paper. See infra note 26 and accompanying text. This failure 
to reauthorize has not affected tribal ability to prosecute non-Indians, however. Because 
Congress reaffirmed tribes’ power as “inherent” rather than as a temporary special grant of 
jurisdiction, the deficits in prosecution are now more the result of funding shortfalls. See 25 
U.S.C. § 1304(b)(1). 
 24. These provisions include the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968 (ICRA), 25 U.S.C. § 
1301 (providing a range of civil rights protections to Indian defendants), the Tribal Law and 
Order Act of 2010 (TLOA), Pub. L. No. 111-211, 124 Stat. 2258 (codified in scattered 
sections of 25 U.S.C.) (providing enhancement of jurisdiction, sentencing, and coordination 
between law enforcement), and the Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, 
§ 904, 127 Stat. at 120 (providing that non-Indian defendants be given all protections of the 
U.S. Constitution in prosecutions in addition to the protections of ICRA and TLOA). 
 25. I should like to make clear that I do not advocate in this paper for the traditional 
American approach to increased criminal prosecution and the accompanying harm of mass 
incarceration, nor is this paper intended to capture any part of the debate over theories of 
punishment, including restorative justice. Indeed, this paper supports the idea that tribes 
should determine what approach to criminal justice is best for their communities. Any 
reference to increased punishment for offenders is intended to showcase disparities rather 
than the best path forward. 
 26. Although VAWA has not yet been reauthorized, one provision in the House version 
of the bill would expand the definition of domestic violence slightly, but significantly, by 
replacing the term “crimes of domestic violence” with “crimes of domestic violence, dating 
violence, obstruction of justice, sexual violence, sex trafficking, stalking, and assault of a 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol45/iss1/7
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SDVCJ constitutes a step in the right direction but, to maintain its 
effectiveness, it must be reformed. 
This paper proceeds in four parts. In Part I, I identify how the limitations 
on the type of crimes that can be prosecuted in tribal courts mirror problems 
from early periods in the domestic violence movement; specifically, I 
discuss the perception that only physical assaults are sufficiently serious to 
be worthy of state sanction, the failure to recognize that domestic violence 
is about power and control over a victim rather than discrete incidents, and 
the systematic challenges in the investigation and prosecution of domestic 
violence crimes. In Part II, I explore how a perpetrator can manipulate the 
elements of SDVCJ, and that even if criminal jurisdiction may be found, 
non-Indian abusers receive more protections than Indian abusers, which 
serves to downplay the severity of battering. In Part III, I argue that 
SDVCJ’s definition of a victim puts the onus on her to prove that she is 
worthy of protection, reflecting the traditional blame placed on the woman 
for failure to prevent her own battering. Finally, in Part IV, I discuss 
potential solutions to these problems and conclude that an extension of 
SDVCJ is appropriate. In particular, I argue that any future iteration of 
SDVCJ should encompass all crimes committed within a domestic violence 
context and without regard to the identity of perpetrator or victim, rather 
than employ a limited focus on discrete incidents and individuals. 
I. Limitations on the Type of Crimes 
The first key limitation of Special Domestic Violence Criminal 
Jurisdiction is the types of crimes that tribal prosecutors may charge. This 
limitation is not built into the statutory language but rather endemic to the 
reality of domestic violence as a complex pattern of behavior rather than a 
few discrete acts. Indeed, the federal statute embraces a rather expansive 
conception of “domestic violence” for purposes of criminal jurisdiction. It 
includes dating violence, domestic violence, and violations of orders of 
protection.
27
 Potential defendants include not only spouses but also intimate 
partners, cohabitators, parents of children in common, or “person[s] 
similarly situated to a spouse . . . under the domestic- or family- violence 
                                                                                                             
law enforcement or corrections officer” and would also include child abuse in the scope of 
“domestic violence.” See Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2019, H.R. 1585, 
116th Cong. § 903 (as passed on April 4, 2019). Although this bill still places significant 
emphasis on physical abuse as the epitome of domestic violence, its expansion of 
jurisdiction is a positive step. 
 27. 25 U.S.C. § 1304(a). 
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laws of an Indian tribe.”
28
 And the tribe itself is free to chart its own course 
in codifying domestic violence crimes: the mens rea, actus reus, elements of 
the crime, penalties,
29
 and even whether to have a generic “crime of 
domestic violence.”
30
 Facially, then, the law does everything it is supposed 
to in giving tribes full authority to prosecute domestic violence perpetrators. 
Examining the statute’s application in practice, however, exposes 
significant gaps. 
A. The Scope of Domestic “Violence” 
What is violence? When does a government deem it sufficiently serious 
to be criminally sanctionable? Is violence somehow more or less tolerable 
when the abuse occurs between romantic partners? The answers to these 
questions have evolved over time. In this section, I consider how modern 
legislation tries to account for modern realities but may in fact enable 
frameworks that belong to a bygone era.  
1. De Facto Physical Contact Requirement 
Domestic violence is not just a single act, but SDVCJ cannot account for 
this reality in a meaningful way. In United States v. Castleman,
31
 the Court 
interpreted a statutory provision against a perpetrator of domestic abuse, but 
its reasoning has broad effects. Under federal law, a person cannot possess 
a gun if he has been convicted of a “misdemeanor crime of domestic 
violence,”
32
 defined to include “the use or attempted use of physical force” 
against an intimate partner.
33
 The Court held that “the common-law 
                                                                                                             
 28. Id. § 1304(a)(2). 
 29. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 322 (1978) (“It is undisputed that 
Indian tribes have power to enforce their criminal laws against tribe members . . . . Their 
right of internal self-government includes the right to prescribe laws applicable to tribe 
members and to enforce those laws by criminal sanctions.”); Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 
380 (1896) (recognizing that “as an autonomous body,” a tribe has the “power to make laws 
defining offences and providing for the trial and punishment of those who violate them”); 
PEVAR, supra note 1, at 99 (“[T]ribes, like other nations, have the inherent right to maintain 
law and order[, which] includes the power to create a police force, establish courts and 
jails, . . . punish tribal members[,] . . . prescribe laws applicable to tribe members and to 
enforce those laws.”). 
 30. See Deborah Tuerkheimer, Recognizing and Remedying the Harm of Battering: A 
Call to Criminalize Domestic Violence, 94 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 959, 1019–21 (2004) 
(arguing for a distinct battering statute in order to “account for truths antithetical to existing 
criminal law paradigms”). 
 31. 572 U.S. 157 (2014). 
 32. 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9). 
 33. Id. § 921(a)(33)(A)(ii). 
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meaning of ‘force’—namely, offensive touching”—was incorporated 
within that definition.
34
 Thus construed, an offense involving “offensive 
touching” (or an attempt) might be considered a misdemeanor crime of 
domestic violence, but a possible implication is that anything that is not 
offensive touching does not constitute domestic violence. The majority 
correctly notes that “[m]inor uses of force may not constitute ‘violence’ in 
the generic sense”; rather, acts like the “relatively minor” physical assaults 
common in domestic violence relationships—pushing, grabbing, pinching, 
squeezing an arm to cause a bruise—are “easy to describe as ‘domestic 
violence,’” a term of art.
35
 But the examples the Court gives all involve 
physical contact of some sort, causing authorities at the federal and tribal 
levels to express some uneasiness about whether other kinds of acts of 
domestic violence could be so construed in a criminal statute. 
Now consider a case from the Pascua Yaqui Tribe in which a non-Indian 
attempted to strike his wife but was so drunk that he missed and fell.
36
 
Tribal prosecutors had a domestic violence law under which they could 
prosecute the husband, but they declined to do so in part because there was 
no actual physical contact.
37
 In the wake of the Castleman decision—
handed down just one month after SDVCJ went into effect for the Pascua 
Yaqui and a few other tribes
38
—tribes worried that such crimes would not 
be considered “domestic violence” under federal law.
39
 Even if an abuser 
does strike his spouse, other crimes committed in the process—ripping 
pictures off the wall and destroying them,
40
 striking his child,
41
 threatening 
                                                                                                             
 34. Castleman, 572 U.S. at 162–63. 
 35. Id. at 165–66.  
 36. NCAI REPORT, supra note 2, at 29. 
 37. Id. 
 38. A pilot program for SDVCJ for the Pascua Yaqui, Umatilla, and Tulalip Tribes 
started on February 6, 2014. All tribes were able to exercise SDVCJ starting in March 2015. 
ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 10, at 318. 
 39. NCAI REPORT, supra note 2, at 29. 
 40. See Catherine F. Klein & Leslye E. Orloff, Providing Legal Protection for Battered 
Women: An Analysis of State Statutes and Case Law, 21 HOFSTRA L. REV. 801, 873–74, 873 
n.438 (1993) (remarking on a study finding that 59% of abusers engaged in property damage 
as a manifestation of their abuse and collecting sources); SUSAN SCHECHTER, WOMEN AND 
MALE VIOLENCE: THE VISIONS AND STRUGGLES OF THE BATTERED WOMEN’S MOVEMENT 223 
(1982) (noting how “destroying favorite objects” maintains the culture of fear in abusive 
households). 
 41. See Klein & Orloff, supra note 40, at 1169–71, 1170 (noting that a “batterer may 
abuse a child to maintain coercive control over the abused parent”) (citing Evan Stark & 
Anne H. Flitcraft, Women and Children at Risk: A Feminist Perspective of Child Abuse, 18 
INT’L J. HEALTH SERV. 97, 104 (1988)). Klein and Orloff note that the vast majority of 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2021





 kicking the dog across the room,
43
 or striking a 
tribal officer who has arrived to keep the peace
44
—go unprosecuted. While 
scholars, advocates, and even tribal prosecutors might immediately 
recognize all of these acts as manifestations of domestic violence,
45
 a tribal 
prosecutor may have doubts about whether anything but a physical assault 
against the other member of an intimate relationship could be proven as a 
crime of domestic violence under the language of the statute. 
This gap is reminiscent of failures in the law that battered women’s 
advocates fought to remedy beginning in the 1970s and 1980s. It evokes 
early notions that domestic violence can exist only if it is physical battery, 
                                                                                                             
children witness domestic violence when it occurs, that children are also battered in the vast 
majority of homes where domestic violence occurs, and that the risk of children going on to 
commit crimes, including domestic violence, themselves, is quite high. See id. at 1169–70. 
 42. In many tribal communities, family structure is very different from the traditional 
European model. Extended family make much more of an appearance, and some choose a 
second set of parents to rear a child as demonstrating shared community “responsibility for 
others’ actions.” See Harriett K. Light & Ruth E. Martin, American Indian Families, J. AM. 
INDIAN EDUC., Oct. 1986, at 1, 2. In this context, it may be far more impactful for a non-
Indian abuser to strike a person who is not the direct spouse because of that person’s 
relationship to the community as a whole. 
 43. The connection between domestic violence and animal abuse is also strong. See 
ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, CHERYL HANNA, EMILY J. SACK & JUDITH G. GREENBERG, 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE LAW: THEORY AND PRACTICE 232 (3d ed. 2013) (noting the 
high correlation and the fact that “[m]any abusers will harm or threaten to harm pets to 
further abuse victims” and the arguments for extending orders of protection to encompass 
pets); Klein & Orloff, supra note 40, at 873 n.444 (“In 83% to 88% of families where 
children are abused, animals in the home are also abused, usually by the abusive parents.”). 
 44. Unlike the other crimes listed, this would constitute a crime of violence because it 
involves a physical assault. However, it would not be prosecutable because the officer is not 
a victim of domestic violence within the scope of the statute. But see H.R. 1585, 116th 
Cong. § 903(4)(G) (2019) (providing for jurisdiction over non-Indians for assaults against a 
law enforcement officer). 
 45. See Klein & Orloff, supra note 40, at 873 n.438 (“Approximately 80% of batterers 
engage in violent behavior towards other targets, such as harming pets and destroying 
objects.”) (citing Lenore E. Walker, Eliminating Sexism to End Battering Relationships: 
Paper Presented at the American Psychological Association, Toronto, Ont. (1984)). 
Explosive, irrational anger at targets other than the victim is a common manifestation of 
abuse. See ANGELA BROWNE, WHEN BATTERED WOMEN KILL 45 (1987) (“Early outbursts of 
violence were frequently directed at objects or against pets, rather than against persons.”). It 
is also present on the Power and Control Wheel under the heading “Using Intimidation.” See 
Domestic Abuse Intervention Programs, Power and Control Wheel [Graphical Material] 
(n.d.), https://www.theduluthmodel.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/PowerandControl.pdf 
(last visited Nov. 17, 2019) [hereinafter Power & Control Wheel] (providing examples of 
“smashing things,” “destroying her property,” and “abusing pets”). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol45/iss1/7
No. 1] SPECIAL FEATURE 221 
 
 
and even then condemned by the law only if it is sufficiently serious.
46
 The 
hurdle is also present only as a result of SDVCJ; in ordinary state 
prosecutions, proving that the act of violence actually is a crime of 
domestic violence is irrelevant as a matter of substantive criminal law.
47
 In 
contrast, tribes can prosecute non-Indians only if they engage in domestic 
violence.
48
 Given the evolving nature of “domestic violence,” including its 
contours and even its definition,
49
 it is not the legislature that sets the 
baseline for elements of a crime; rather, the baseline is what society, 
through prosecutorial discretion, jury decision-making, and judicial 
interpretation, thinks constitutes a crime worthy of punishment in the tribal 
courts. And it is not a purely hypothetical matter; the National Congress of 
American Indians has documented several situations in which tribal 




Thus, even clear incidents that demonstrate other dimensions of the 
battering experience, such as treating all of a victim’s income as the 
abuser’s own (economic abuse) or blackmailing the victim for her 
perceived misdeeds, may be, for the most part, abandoned by tribal 
prosecutors. This is not just a gap that federal prosecutors must fill for 
efficiency purposes; it causes real harm. As we understand from other 
contexts, emphasizing physical violence over other forms of violence has a 
psychologically damaging effect on victims,
51
 a distorting effect on societal 
                                                                                                             
 46. See, e.g., Bradley v. State, 1 Miss. (1 Walker) 158 (1824) (holding that a husband 
had the “right of moderate chastisement” in the battering of his wife if he “confined himself 
within reasonable bounds”). 
 47. While classifications as “domestic violence” crimes may be relevant for sentencing 
or collateral consequences—possibility of deportation for noncitizens, or restrictions on gun 
possession, for instance—these classifications do not matter in obtaining a conviction, so 
long as the prosecutor proves every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. 
 48. See supra notes 21–23 and accompanying text. 
 49. One definition of domestic violence may be “the use of emotional, psychological, 
physical, sexual abuse, or threats in intimate adult or teen relationships in order to exert 
power and control over the other.” The absence of a unified definition may be a strength, as 
it allows our understanding of domestic violence to be dynamic, but it also presents a 
challenge in writing a federal statute. 
 50. For examples of such declinations, see NCAI REPORT, supra note 2, at 28–29. 
 51. See Diane R. Follingstad et al., The Role of Emotional Abuse in Physically Abusive 
Relationships, 5 J. FAM. VIOLENCE 107, 109, 113–14 (1990) (providing statistics about the 
emotional and psychological effect of abusers engaging in property damage, including the 
fact that 72% of women reported that the emotional abuse was worse than the physical 
abuse); Karla Fischer et al., The Culture of Battering and the Role of Mediation in Domestic 
Violence Cases, 46 SMU L. REV. 2117, 2123–24 (1993) (“Some battered women have 
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understandings of domestic violence,
52
 a suppressive effect on the gathering 
of statistical evidence of its prevalence,
53
 and a recursive effect on the 
justice system.
54
 As scholars note, “[t]he same emphasis on incidents of 
physical violence, independent of the broader context in which they occur, 
has tended to characterize the legal framework within which crimes of 
domestic violence are adjudicated.”
55
 What society views as most harmful, 
and what is often a sine qua non of vindication of a victim’s rights in the 
courtroom, are these kinds of physical assaults;
56
 this “limited legal focus 
often results in an underestimation of the danger posed by a batterer, and 
the imposition of an inadequate sanction, which leaves his partner 





                                                                                                             
described psychological degradation and humiliation as the most painful abuse they have 
experienced. The impact of this kind of abuse can be long lasting and harmful to women’s 
psychological health.”). 
 52. See Fischer et al., supra note 51, at 2121–22 (“[T]he prevailing stereotype about 
domestic violence is that assaults are ‘physical, frequent, and life threatening.’ Yet, the 
reality of battered women’s lives does not conform solely to this image. Advocates for 
battered women have long noted that financial abuse and property abuse are forms of 
emotional abuse inflicted upon women . . . in an effort to gain control over them or keep 
them in a state of fear.”) (quoting LIZ KELLY, SURVIVING SEXUAL VIOLENCE 150 (1988)).  
 53. See Follingstad et al., supra note 51, at 109–10 (discussing the extent to which 
emotional abuse may be present but unreported and its relationship to physical abuse). 
 54. See PAUL C. FRIDAY ET AL., EVALUATING THE IMPACT OF A SPECIALIZED DOMESTIC 
VIOLENCE POLICE UNIT (2006), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/215916.pdf. This 
study noted that the historical treatment of women “has often been superficial, inefficient 
and left victims confused and discouraged.” Id. at 10. Further, “crimes of violence among 
intimates, more than other forms of violent instances, are under-reported and 
underestimated . . . . [A]lmost half of all incidents of violence against women by intimates 
are never reported to the police.” Id. at 9. The study also remarks that other entities claim 
that non-physical forms of abuse may never be reported, putting the number down to only 
one in 100. Id. In any event, “woman-battering incidents constitute the largest category of 
calls screened by police officers each year.” Id. According to the authors, “family 
disturbance calls account for between 15 and 40 percent of all calls received by police 
departments nationwide.” Id. (citing JAMES E. HENDRICKS & CINDY S. HENDRICKS, CRISIS 
INTERVENTION IN CRIMINAL JUSTICE AND SOCIAL SERVICE (1991)). 
 55. SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 43, at 43. 
 56. Even courts sympathetic to domestic violence tend to center the discussion on 
physical abuse. See United States v. Castleman, 572 U.S. 157, 161–63 (2014). 
 57. SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 43, at 43. 
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2. Lax Enforcement 
Tribal governments’ refusal to prosecute these crimes—otherwise 
prosecutable but for this difficulty of proving a domestic violence 
component—echoes earlier refusals to arrest or prosecute abusers despite 
clear evidence that they committed an abusive act. For example, police 
would encourage the abuser to calm down by taking a walk around the 
block or blame the victim for provoking his anger.
58
 In the 1970s, the 
                                                                                                             
 58. Reva Siegel describes unsettling tales of the police’s historical abandonment of 
women in need. She writes: 
 . . . Rather than punish those who assaulted their partners, the judges and 
social workers urged couples to reconcile, providing informal or formal 
counseling designed to preserve the relationship whenever possible. Battered 
wives were discouraged from filing criminal charges against their husbands, 
urged to accept responsibility for their role in provoking the violence, and 
encouraged to remain in the relationship and rebuild it rather than attempt to 
separate or divorce. The police adjusted their arrest procedures to accord with 
the new philosophy of the domestic relations courts, channeling family 
violence cases out of the criminal justice system and into counseling whenever 
possible. In this institutional framework, physical assault was not viewed as 
criminal conduct; instead it was viewed as an expression of emotions that 
needed to be adjusted and rechanneled into marriage. 
 The criminal justice system regulated marital violence in this “therapeutic” 
framework for much of the twentieth century. There was no formal immunity 
rule as in tort law, but the criminal justice system developed a set of formal 
procedures for handling marital violence—which it justified in the discourse of 
affective privacy—that provided informal immunity for the conduct in many 
circumstances. In the 1960s, for example, the training bulletin of the 
International Association of Chiefs of Police offered the following instructions 
for handling “family disturbances”: 
For the most part these disputes are personal matters requiring no 
direct police action. However, an inquiry into the facts must be made 
to satisfy the originating complaint . . . . Once inside the home, the 
officer’s sole purpose is to preserve the peace . . . [a]ttempt to 
soothe feelings, pacify parties . . . [s]uggest parties refer their 
problem to a church or a community agency . . . . In dealing with 
family disputes the power of arrest should be exercised as a last 
resort. The officer should never create a police problem when there 
is only a family problem existing. 
 Until the last decade, this set of instructions was quite typical of police 
procedure in American cities. 
Reva B. Siegel, “The Rule of Love”: Wife Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE 
L.J. 2117, 2170–71 (1996) (quoting INT’L ASS’N OF POLICE CHIEFS, TRAINING KEY NO. 16, 
HANDLING DISTURBANCE CALLS 94–95 (1968-69)) (alterations in original) (footnotes 
deleted). 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2021
224 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45 
 
 
failure of police to arrest batterers was challenged in the courts, “rais[ing] 
the dramatic notion that domestic violence was criminal, sanctionable 
activity that was a harm against the ‘public,’ the state, not just an individual 
woman.”
59
 SDVCJ now unintentionally rolls back this progress by 
narrowing jurisdiction to only the most “serious” forms of violence, which 
in effect tells a victim that the law will only intervene to protect her when it 
violates some indignity that the whole community would identify as too 
far—a “rule of thumb”
60
 of sorts. Many aspects of domestic violence that 
fall short of physical assaults affect tribal communities, but SDVCJ ignores 
this effect and informs a victim that she cannot take charge of her own 
safety except in very limited, public-adjacent circumstances; such situations 
are those that members of the relevant community would all agree 
constitute “real” violence. We have heard this before, that power and 
control over a woman is a “private” affair—one for which the courthouse 
doors are rarely opened.
61
 While there is no doubt modern tribal prosecutors 
do not believe this assertion personally or professionally, SDVCJ ties their 
hands, in effect making power and control tolerable so long as it stays 
within the four walls of a home. And given lax enforcement at the federal 
level of even serious violence against women, Congress’s delegation of 
enforcement of a crime they themselves were unwilling to take seriously 
has unwittingly reinforced the idea that the tribe alone must reckon with 
this problem. 
The domestic violence movement as a whole is combatting this effect by 
encouraging societal and judicial recognition of domestic violence as an 
interpersonal dynamic shaped by one person’s power and control over the 
other, rather than as a series of discrete abusive incidents.
62
 But even after 
                                                                                                             
 59. SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 43, at 22. 
 60. The “rule of thumb” has taken on a meaning in some circles, similar to the holding 
of Bradley v. State, 1 Miss. (1 Walker) 158 (1824), that a man might beat his wife with a 
tool no wider than a thumb. The origin of the phrase may lie elsewhere, see PATRICIA T. 
O’CONNER & STEWART KELLERMAN, ORIGINS OF THE SPECIOUS: MYTHS AND 
MISCONCEPTIONS OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 123–24 (2009), but the concept endures. 
 61. See generally Siegel, supra note 58, at 2150–61 (discussing the role of “privacy” in 
marriage as a barrier to treating domestic violence seriously). 
 62. Emily J. Sack, United States v. Castleman: The Meaning of Domestic Violence, 20 
ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 128 (2015). Sack argues that the Court “expressed a refined and 
accurate understanding of the concept of domestic violence,” id. at 141, by centering “power 
and control” over a victim as the lynchpin of domestic violence relationships, id. at 142. It is 
this accuracy that creates some anxiety about the fate of SDVCJ: Power and control is not a 
legal definition, unlike the more concrete “offensive touching”, and this abstractness may be 
beyond the willingness or ability of juries to understand without a physical assault. As a 
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Castleman, the broadest statutory language must be tethered to public 
perceptions of domestic violence, which do not track those of scholars and 
advocates.
63
 Because SDVCJ is attached only to domestic violence crimes, 
the Department of Justice advised tribes to prosecute crimes only when they 
came into the ambit of the “common understanding of the term ‘violence’ 
in ordinary language” and fell under conduct described in the term “crime 
of violence” as codified in 18 U.S.C. § 16(a), a definitional section of the 
general provisions chapter of the federal criminal code.
64
 For better or 
worse, the state of confusion around precisely what conduct falls under this 
provision has only increased after the Supreme Court recently ruled that the 
residual clause of § 16(b)
65
—a closely related definitional provision that 
could be relevant in a tribal prosecution—was “unconstitutionally vague.”
66
 
Nonetheless consistent with Castleman, there appears to be de facto built-in 
requirements of “force” and “injury” that make SDVCJ only as good as 
unenlightened arbiters of the law would recognize. In other words, public 
perception of “violence” is narrow in the same way Justice Scalia argued in 
his Castleman concurrence: it only extends to physical assaults involving 
“force” and “injury”—components that victims tend to say is not nearly as 




This bare fact recalls mid-century notions of domestic abuse as having a 
qualitatively more private character than what we know is a matter of 
public concern today: that “battering ha[s] to be declared socially, not 
privately, caused.”
68
 The reticence of government to extend their power 
beyond a narrow, physical assault-based view of domestic violence means 
                                                                                                             
result, tribes exercising SDVCJ must be careful not to extend the carefully crafted holding of 
Castleman too far. See also supra text accompanying notes 31–45 (discussing the Court’s 
focus, necessary by the facts of the case but worrisome for broader implications, on physical 
touching). 
 63. See Sack, supra note 62. 
 64. NCAI REPORT, supra note 2, at 28; see also 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) (“The term ‘crime of 
violence’ means . . . (a) an offense that has as an element the use, attempted use, or 
threatened use of physical force against the person or property of another . . . .”). 
 65. 18 U.S.C. § 16(b) (“The term ‘crime of violence’ means . . . (b) any other offense 
that is a felony and that, by its nature, involves a substantial risk that physical force against 
the person or property of another may be used in the course of committing the offense.”). 
 66. Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204, 1223, (2018) (5-4 decision) (quoting Johnson 
v. United States, 576 U.S. 591, 597 (2015)). 
 67. See supra note 51; see also United States v. Castleman, 572 U.S. 157, 173–83 
(2014) (Scalia, J., concurring). 
 68. SCHECHTER, supra note 40, at 43; see also id. at 29–81 (discussing the origins of the 
domestic violence movement and its move from private life to public discourse). 
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victims will be frozen in time until law enforcement can convince fact-
finders of the broader potential implication of Castleman—that domestic 
violence encompasses far more than what the neighbors think it does. This 
consequence has not yet been explicitly stated by the Court. By de facto 
authorizing only the prosecution of physical assaults, SDVCJ returns the 
prosecution of domestic violence to the pre-modern era, when no other 
kinds of crimes were even recognized as domestic violence in the first 
place. The effect is that SDVCJ leaves large categories of domestic 
violence entirely excluded from the public definition of this phenomenon, 
relegating acts within those categories to a state of private affairs unworthy 
of public sanction. 
3. Auxiliary Crimes 
Third, SDVCJ will not cover crimes that are offshoots of domestic 
violence, even if they are not crimes of domestic violence themselves. This 
phenomenon appears in two varieties. First, a non-Indian abuser may 
involve the Indian victim in a series of non-domestic-violence crimes, such 
as forcing his spouse to steal or to use drugs. The non-Indian abuser cannot 
be held to account in tribal court for the underlying larceny and drug 
offenses.
69
 Meanwhile, prosecutors may easily charge the victim for these 
crimes, as there are no barriers to prosecuting Indians in tribal court,
70
 and 
the victim’s defenses to these charges (duress, for example) may be less 
probative to a jury if she cannot point to a parallel charge or conviction 
against her abuser. Assuming evidence of her abuser’s charges
71
 is 
admissible in her own trial in tribal court, it would bear directly on her 
mental state, which is generally deemed exculpatory if duress is truly 
present.
72
 The absence of a similar prosecution against the abuser, solely for 
                                                                                                             
 69. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978); see also supra text 
accompanying notes 21–23. 
 70. On tribal lands, tribal court jurisdiction is exclusive over Indians who commit minor 
crimes against other Indians, and concurrent with the federal government over Indians who 
commit major crimes or crimes against non-Indians. See PEVAR, supra note 1, at 128; 
ANDERSON ET AL., supra note 10, at 307–13. 
 71. It is not only convictions that may be admitted in some tribal courts. Each tribe 
defines the scope of admissible evidence, and some tribes may not have a strong 
presumption of innocence until proven guilty. See PEVAR, supra note 1, at 99 (remarking 
that tribal governments retain general powers to establish criminal systems). 
 72. See, e.g., United States v. Hearst, 563 F.2d 1331, 1335 n.1 (9th Cir. 1977) (“A 
defendant who, without opportunity to escape, has a well grounded fear of imminent death 
or serious injury unless [s]he complies with [her] captor’s wrongful commands entertains a 
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jurisdictional reasons, would force the Indian victim to testify in her own 
defense or rely on other less probative evidence of her mental state. The 
fact that her abuser has not faced any reprimand for his abuse also dilutes 
the quality of the victim’s own testimony, as demonstrated in cases like 
Dixon v. United States;
73
 here, judicial reluctance to admit expert testimony 
on battered women’s syndrome (BWS) likely played a role in causing her 
duress defense to be unsuccessful.
74
 Even as expert testimony on battering 
has become admissible in all fifty states, the admissibility is only probative 
if the jury has other evidence that battering actually occurred. Because non-
Indians are not prosecuted for such acts in the context of a drug abuse 
incident, for example, the misalignment may cause juries to view BWS 
testimony with suspicion. 
In a second variety, a non-Indian abuser may engage in domestic 
violence without involving the victim per se—something even the favorable 
dicta of Castleman would not plausibly entertain.
75
 Witness tampering, 
juror intimidation, bribing government officials, assaulting tribal officers, 
and perjury are all crimes that denigrate the judicial process by which 
abusers may be held to account and victims may be protected. But these 
kinds of crimes are “auxiliary” in the sense that they are not usually 
considered crimes of domestic violence, even though they arise only 
because the perpetrator is seeking to further entrench his power and control 
over the victim. While states and local governments would ordinarily have 
no barriers to attaching such crimes onto other charges or charging them 




In one situation, a non-Indian man was haled into court for a domestic 
violence charge, but walked out of the courtroom in the middle of the 
proceeding, constituting a brazen offense of contempt of court.
77
 Acts such 
                                                                                                             
mental state recognized as exculpatory with respect to most crimes. Compulsion or duress 
producing this state of mind is a defense to most criminal accusations.”). 
 73. 548 U.S. 1 (2006). 
 74. The defendant was tried on multiple firearms charges after providing false 
information to dealers at a gun show. The trial court refused to admit evidence of BWS, and 
the appellate court affirmed. Id. at 3–4. 
 75. Again, scholars and advocates may differ from the judiciary on what constitutes 
domestic violence. Using others to achieve abusive ends is a prominent feature of the power 
and control wheel. See Power & Control Wheel, supra note 45 (providing examples of how 
an abuser might use the judicial systems against a victim or use children as pawns). 
 76. But see supra note 26 (discussing a House bill that would allow prosecutions for 
obstruction of justice). 
 77. NCAI REPORT, supra note 2, at 27. 
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as this impugn the integrity of the proceeding—a hallmark of the branch of 
government with the power of neither purse nor sword—and diminish the 
public perception of justice essential to the rule of law. The likelihood of 
women reporting, testifying, and cooperating is diminished by such extra-
legal acts because of the women’s relationship with their abusers
78
 and also 




In some sense, then, SDVCJ misses the forest for the trees; by granting 
jurisdiction over crimes of domestic violence, it ignores incidents of 
domestic violence that may also be crimes. This failure is just as harmful to 
the protection of the victim and to the sense of justice in tribal communities 
as is allowing these forms of abuse to continue. Tribes recognize this 
harmful effect, remarking that prosecutors are left “unable to hold offenders 
accountable for criminal conduct not covered by SDVCJ,” allowing 
offenders to escape with a criminal record that “may not accurately reflect 
the magnitude of the crimes committed.”
80
 There is also a concern that the 
grant of jurisdiction to tribes over the domestic violence charge would have 
a mitigating effect: the federal government may simply decline to prosecute 
either crime when the tribe charged one crime.
81
 But empirical evidence on 
this point is limited because SDVCJ is just seven years old and its future 
hangs in doubt due to an ongoing funding lapse. 
B. Prosecution Strategy 
Because SDVCJ limits the types of crimes that may be charged, 
prosecutors also have limited tools to contain domestic violence. In 
                                                                                                             
 78. See Judith S. Kaye & Susan K. Knipps, Judicial Responses to Domestic Violence: 
The Case for a Problem Solving Approach, 27 W. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 4 (2000) (“Unlike 
victims of random attacks, battered women often have compelling reasons—like fear, 
economic dependence or affection—to feel ambivalent about cooperating with the legal 
process. In a system that generally assumes a victim’s willingness to cooperate, this 
ambivalence is an anomaly that frequently results in the dismissal of the case.”). 
 79. See Victim Satisfaction with the Criminal Justice System, NAT’L INST. JUST. (Jan. 1, 
2006), https://nij.ojp.gov/topics/articles/victim-satisfaction-criminal-justice-system (“[V]ictim 
satisfaction in domestic violence cases appeared to hinge on the extent to which the victim felt 
control over ending the violence in the incident, control over her offender’s future conduct—
and even over the criminal justice system. When the victim had a low sense of control, 
satisfaction with the system decreased significantly.”). Many women felt that “the actions of 
the police negatively affected their safety” and “wanted the prosecutor to make charges against 
the offender more severe.” Id. 
 80. NCAI REPORT, supra note 2, at 22. 
 81. See also infra note 85 (describing federal abstention practices when the tribe has 
already punished a member for an infraction). 
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ordinary state prosecutions, there are often multiple crimes a prosecutor 
may charge with respect to a single incident. But during the plea 
negotiations process, prosecutors often drop, reduce, or never formally file 
charges in order to secure a guilty plea from the defendant and save the 
tribe’s resources. In tribal prosecutions, by contrast, prosecutors cannot 
charge non-Indian defendants with disorderly conduct, harassment, public 




1. No Incentive for Defendant to Plea Bargain 
There are two primary effects of this impairment on prosecutorial 
strategy. First, unless the incident is truly confined to a physical assault or 
other uncontestable incident of “domestic violence” and nothing more—
rare, by the lights of prosecutors
83
—then the defendant has little incentive 
to cooperate. While federal prosecutors may take up non-domestic violence 
charges, this possibility is true regardless of whether the defendant is Indian 
or non-Indian and regardless of whether the crime is one of domestic 
violence.
84
 Moreover, federal prosecutors would have less of an incentive to 
take up the case for the “additional” charges if tribes proceeded toward 
prosecuting the domestic violence crime already.
85
 Because the defendant 
                                                                                                             
 82. See Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978). 
 83. See NAT’L DIST. ATT’YS ASS’N, WOMEN PROSECUTORS SECTION, NATIONAL 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE PROSECUTION BEST PRACTICES GUIDE 24 (2017), https://ndaa.org/wp-
content/uploads/NDAA-DV-White-Paper-FINAL-revised-July-17-2017-1.pdf (noting that 
other charges “commonly supported by the evidence include assault, battery, burglary, 
robbery, theft, false imprisonment, carjacking, mayhem, stalking, criminal threats, 
kidnapping, and child endangerment”). 
 84. At this point in the doctrine, both tribes and the federal government have 
independent sovereign interests and therefore there is no double jeopardy problem. See 
United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 329–30 (1978). This was one major consideration in 
the overruling of Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). See United 
States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 205–07 (2004). Congress carefully crafted language to avoid 
any double jeopardy implications by reaffirming the “inherent” power of tribes to prosecute 
non-Indians but limiting it to domestic violence cases. See 25 U.S.C. § 1304(b)(1). 
 85. The General Crimes Act actually contains a carveout, disclaiming federal 
jurisdiction over Indians who have been punished by the tribe already for the same crime. 
See 18 U.S.C. § 1152. This means that although there is no double jeopardy implication, see 
Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, there may not be a crime to charge on the federal level if it is against 
an Indian. Federal prosecutors would therefore almost certainly decline to prosecute an 
Indian where the tribe has been involved in prosecuting “minor” crimes, and therefore may 
have a presumption against any prosecution at all. See DOJ DECLINATION STATISTICS, supra 
note 18, at 10 (noting that at least 10% of declinations occurred because another authority 
planned to prosecute); PEVAR, supra note 1, at 131–34.  
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has little incentive to cooperate, he may be more likely to take the case to 
trial, representing higher costs for the tribe. A trial may also provide a 
relatively high chance of acquittal, since a non-Indian is guaranteed a jury 
that contains a cross-section of non-Indians.
86
 This guarantee is not required 
as a matter of federal Indian law,
87
 nor is it typically required as a matter of 
tribal law; rather, it is specifically imposed by SDVCJ.
88
 
As a result, a non-Indian defendant has all of the bargaining power. 
Prosecutors have virtually no chips to give away. They could refer the case 
to the federal government, but this is known to have little effect, since 
federal declination rates were extremely high prior to the enactment of 
SDVCJ.
89
 They could also simply charge the highest domestic violence 
crime available and stick to it, but this means that the starting point in plea 
negotiations is the lowest it can go. These impediments constitute a 
substantial intrusion into prosecutorial discretion, a core executive function. 
They also threaten overall conviction rates, since the highest charge 
available is also often the most difficult to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt. The limitation on charging decisions has harmful ripple effects on 
other aspects of prosecution, including the assurance of particular 
witnesses’ presence, resource constraints in prosecuting crimes in rural 
areas, and increased detention costs to the tribe. 
Again, the harm that this dynamic recalls is the power and control the 
abuser persistently holds over the judicial system. In such situations, the 
victim is relegated to a state of quasi-coverture: she has de jure legal 
existence separate from her husband, but de facto cannot petition her 
government for protection unless and until he physically incapacitates her. 
The lower quantity of crimes chargeable, and lower rates of convictions on 
those crimes, effectively puts the state’s imprimatur on non-recognition of 
the societal factors leading to domestic violence, such as the culture of fear 
maintained through property damage, threats, substance abuse, and 
                                                                                                             
 86. It is no surprise that juries composed of people of the defendant’s race are more 
likely to acquit. Cf. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303, 304 (1879) (holding that the 
jury venire in a black man’s trial must enjoy a cross-section of the community, including 
other black men, and discussing approvingly the defendant’s argument that “the probabilities 
of a denial of them to him as such citizen on every trial which might take place on the 
indictment in the courts of the State were much more enhanced than if he was a white man”). 
 87. See Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896) (holding that protections of the U.S. 
Constitution do not apply to tribal court proceedings). But see 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (providing 
the extension of most constitutional protections by statute). 
 88. 25 U.S.C. § 1304(d)(3)(B). 
 89. See DOJ DECLINATION STATISTICS, supra note 18, at 24 (noting that half of all 
crimes referred to federal prosecutors were declined). 
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arbitrary coercive rules. This bargaining power differential reflects abusers’ 
intimidation tactics
90




2. Evidence and Trial Strategy 
The second effect of this limited prosecutorial capability is on evidence 
and trial strategy. Absent the ability to charge other crimes, the domestic 
violence charge will be the focus of any trial. In turn, the victim’s testimony 
will be indispensable, creating a host of problems for burdens of proof and 
witness credibility. As cases like State v. Borelli
92
 and People v. Santiago
93
 
demonstrate, victims of domestic violence often recant their testimony or 
act as unreliable narrators as a result of the psychological and emotional 
abuse at the hands of their abusers.
94
 And as many Confrontation Clause 
cases present, victims may not even testify at all—whether for fear of 
reprisal, a desire to stay out of re-traumatizing judicial process, or because 
they retain an emotional attachment to the abuser.
95
 In some circumstances, 
a defendant acts to keep victims off the stand without triggering the 
forfeiture-by-wrongdoing doctrine, allowing critical testimonial statements 
to remain hidden from the jury.
96
 
The inability to prosecute certain crimes as a result of SDVCJ mirrors 
the harms present in the Confrontation Clause cases.
97
 As Cheryl Hanna 
                                                                                                             
 90. See Power & Control Wheel, supra note 45. 
 91. See DAVID ADAMS, WHY DO THEY KILL? 26–32 (2007) (discussing batterer profiles 
as nearly invariably consisting of “jealousy and possessiveness,” and often consisting of 
minimization of their role in violence or refusal to believe their “intimidating behaviors” are 
violent). 
 92. 629 A.2d 1105 (Conn. 1993) (discussing the evidentiary difficulties when the victim 
recanted her testimony on the stand). 
 93. No. 2725–02, 2003 WL 21507176 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Apr. 7, 2003) (noting that the 
victim declined to testify against the defendant or otherwise cooperate with the prosecution 
in part because the defendant had intimidated her from his jail cell). 
 94. See also People v. Brown, 117 Cal. Rptr. 2d 738 (Cal. App. Dep’t Super. Ct. 2001) 
(discussing a domestic violence victim’s inconsistent statements between the incident and 
the time of trial). 
 95. See the approach to the admissibility of hearsay evidence that the Court took with 
respect to the diverging results in the domestic violence scenarios in Davis v. Washington, 
547 U.S. 813 (2006) (consolidating Davis v. Washington, 64 P.3d 661 (Wash. Ct. App. 
2003) and Hammon v. Indiana, 809 N.E.2d 945 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004)). 
 96. See, e.g., Giles v. California, 554 U.S. 353 (2008). 
 97. The doctrine of the Confrontation Clause has been in development since the 
watershed case of Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), in which the Court held that 
a defendant has a constitutional right to confront witnesses against him when they make 
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recounts, victim participation in trials against abusers is notoriously 
difficult, even when prosecutorial policies mandate it.
98
 While certainly not 
a bad thing in the abstract, a relatively pro-defendant understanding of the 
Confrontation Clause has deleterious consequences on domestic violence 
victims; here, it is quite simple for abusers to eliminate a crucial piece of 
evidence.  
Hanna argues for a shift away from victim testimony to other kinds of 
evidence.
99
 While this argument may be persuasive in theory, the reality for 
tribes is different. On Indian reservations, which are predominantly rural 
and overwhelmingly poor, there are fewer witnesses to call, fewer police to 
investigate and collect physical evidence, fewer techniques to evaluate such 
physical evidence, fewer resources to pay experts to testify about these 
techniques, and so on.
100
 Moreover, the harm in rural areas, including 
Indian reservations, may be more severe just because the areas are rural.
101
 
A victim’s testimony therefore means more on the reservation than it does 
off the reservation; a system like SDVCJ that unwittingly places prime 
importance on the quality of the victim’s testimony risks lower prosecution 
of domestic violence all around. The federal government has bowed out in 
                                                                                                             
testimonial statements. This raised important questions about whether domestic violence 
victims had to confront their abusers in court. See Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After 
Crawford, 91 VA. L. REV. 747 (2005). The Court confirmed that Crawford’s constitutional 
protection also extended to abusers, even when it meant that the victims would not testify. 
See Davis, 547 U.S. at 832–33 (“This particular type of crime [domestic violence] is 
notoriously susceptible to intimidation or coercion of the victim to ensure that she does not 
testify at trial. When this occurs, the Confrontation Clause gives the criminal a windfall.  We 
may not, however, vitiate constitutional guarantees when they have the effect of allowing the 
guilty to go free.”). 
 98. See Cheryl Hanna, No Right to Choose: Mandated Victim Participation in Domestic 
Violence Prosecutions, 109 HARV. L. REV. 1849 (1996). 
 99. Id. at 1900 (“[P]rosecutors [who] rely only on victim testimony to obtain 
convictions . . . are not doing their jobs, and may in fact be breaching their ethical 
obligations.”). 
 100. See, e.g., John Koppisch, Why Are Indian Reservations So Poor? A Look at the 
Bottom 1%, FORBES (Dec. 13, 2011), https://www.forbes.com/sites/johnkoppisch/ 
2011/12/13/why-are-indian-reservations-so-poor-a-look-at-the-bottom-1/?sh=12e9ba1d3c07 
(discussing some of the challenges that face reservations, including government 
interventions that inhibited property-based prosperity, undeveloped markets and legal 
systems, unreliable business climates, and dependency). 
 101. See Lisa R. Pruitt, Place Matters: Domestic Violence and Rural Difference, 23 WIS. 
J. L. GENDER & SOC’Y 347, 349–50 (2008) (“Place is . . . a very strong predictor of intimate 
partner homicide . . . . [R]ural perpetrators of intimate abuse were nearly twice as likely as 
their urban counterparts to inflict severe physical injuries. They were also more likely to use 
a weapon during their assaults.”). 
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deference to tribal sovereignty, but the Confrontation Clause and hearsay 
rules remain the same, and life on reservations presents unique challenges 
to prosecution of domestic violence. The legal, financial, and logistical 
constraints on amassing proper evidence therefore make the tribes unable to 
fill the vacuum, and the perverse effect of SDVCJ is that it may actually 
increase the impunity of abusers. 
C. Investigation Constraints 
A third key constraint on the justice system as a result of SDVCJ is the 
tribal police’s ability to investigate other crimes in the context of the 
domestic violence incident. As opposed to the prosecutors’ role in obtaining 
convictions for crimes, investigation of crimes comes early in the process, 
possibly even before prosecutors know that a potential defendant is Indian 
or non-Indian. With drug crimes, which heavily correlate independently 
with both Indian reservations
102
 and domestic abuse,
103
 a tribal officer may 
be precluded from arresting a person, searching a home, or mitigating a 
threat due to continued drug use. They will be deterred from consuming 
resources on even an easily provable crime if they cannot identify the 
defendant’s race up-front. 
For example, on the Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate Reservation in South 
Dakota, tribal police discovered methamphetamines on the premises after a 
domestic violence call but were unable to obtain a search warrant from a 
tribal court judge to perform a urinalysis.
104
 The fact pattern described does 
not mention the nature of the relationship between the drug possessor and 
the victim,
105
 but one could easily imagine situations in which justice to the 
victim is denied. It is possible, and even likely, that the use of 
methamphetamines was a factor in causing or exacerbating an assault on 
the victim, but because jurisdiction is not available in such circumstances, 
                                                                                                             
 102. See SUBST. ABUSE & MENTAL HEALTH SERVS. ADMIN., RESULTS FROM THE 2013 
NATIONAL SURVEY ON DRUG USE AND HEALTH: SUMMARY OF NATIONAL FINDINGS 26, 88 
(2014), https://www.samhsa.gov/data/sites/default/files/NSDUHresultsPDFWHTML2013/ 
Web/NSDUHresults2013.pdf (noting that Indians had higher rates of drug use than any other 
racial or ethnic category and the highest rate of drug and alcohol dependence at 14.9% of the 
population). 
 103. See ADAMS, supra note 91, at 24 (collecting research showing that 40% to 60% of 
abusive men suffer from alcoholism and 40% from drug abuse, and 31% had criminal 
involvement due to their drinking, such as drunk driving or fighting). Preliminary data 
showed that 51% of SDVCJ cases involved drug or alcohol use. NCAI REPORT, supra note 
2, at 8. 
 104. NCAI REPORT, supra note 2, at 26. 
 105. See id. 
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the involvement of methamphetamines is essentially ignored. For context, 
the federal government has a peculiar disposition toward prosecuting drug 
crimes in Indian Country and largely ignoring violent crimes against 
women.
106
 When advocates speak of domestic violence as operating within 
a broader context, they mean to include potential factors like drug use and 
concurrent crimes as contributing to the perpetuation of domestic 
violence.
107
 But because of SDVCJ, tribal officers and courts must shut 
their eyes to such factors. Whether this willful blindness has a negative 
effect on the overall ability of tribes to achieve their desired criminal justice 
objectives through traditional prosecutorial decision-making remains to be 
seen. 
In addition to investigators ignoring the attendant circumstances, so to 
speak, one can also imagine an opportunity for willful obstruction that the 
tribe cannot punish. In the Sisseton-Wahpeton Oyate case, for instance, 
suppose that the victim answered the door with no ongoing domestic 
violence emergency, but consented to a search of her home because she 
said that her non-Indian co-occupant was abusing methamphetamines on 
the premises.
108
 The rule stated in Georgia v. Randolph
109
 is that a present 
co-occupant may refuse to permit entry without a warrant. The non-Indian 
co-occupant could refuse to allow entry, and, since the crime to be 
investigated would be unrelated to domestic violence, he would evade tribal 
jurisdiction for drug charges. By the time a federal court granted a search 
warrant on referral to federal prosecutors, evidence could be flushed or 
                                                                                                             
 106. See DOJ DECLINATION STATISTICS, supra note 18, at 9, 24. Of all crimes referred to 
federal prosecutors in a period prior to SDVCJ, homicide, assault, and sexual abuse and 
related offenses comprised at least 61% of referrals. Id. at 9. Drug offenses comprised 7% of 
referrals. Id. At the same time, federal prosecutors declined to charge in 3378 out of 6142 
referrals for homicide, assault, and sexual abuse and related offenses, for a combined rate of 
55%. Id. at 24. Meanwhile, the declination rate for drug crimes was 18%. Id.  
 107. See ADAMS, supra note 91, at 24 (discussing the role of alcoholism and drug abuse 
in battering). 
 108. The principal protections of the Fourth Amendment for Indian defendants are 
codified in a statute, the Tribal Law and Order Act (TLOA), not the Constitution. See 25 
U.S.C. § 1302(a)(2) (“No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall . . . 
violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects 
against unreasonable search and seizures, nor issue warrants, but upon probable cause, 
supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the 
person or thing to be seized.”). Tribal courts operating under TLOA and interpreting these 
statutes do not have to follow U.S. Supreme Court precedent. As a result, the rule in Georgia 
v. Randolph, 547 U.S. 103 (2006), may or may not apply to Indian defendants, depending on 
the law of the tribe. 
 109. 547 U.S. 103 (2006). 
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 or the prosecution would have to be bifurcated between the 
tribal court and the federal court, which probably would result in a federal 
declination.
111
 This fact would make the incident of violence “less severe” 
in the eyes of the law because it appears as a simple, isolated incident of 
assault, with no corresponding exacerbating circumstance like substance 
abuse.  
This characterization is actively harmful. As scholars note, “the legal 
system has historically denied or minimized abuse in intimate relationships, 
and focused on single incidents of violence rather than grappling with the 
broader context in which these incidents occur.”
112
 Much like older court 
cases that portray domestic violence as “invisible or distorted,”
113
 SDVCJ 
forces tribes to grapple with domestic violence in a superficial way. Tribal 
officers can stop a single incident of assault, but the factors that allow 
domestic violence to continue will not be abated without considering the 
broader context of the role of substance abuse in domestic violence. Notice, 
too, how Randolph’s nominally stronger civil libertarian rule—that a 
present co-occupant may prevent an otherwise lawful search—serves to 
prioritize the “private” aspects of a relationship over the “public” nature of 




II. Limitations Based on the Identity of the Perpetrator 
Another restriction on SDVCJ is the identity of the perpetrator. If the 
abuser is Indian, there are few restrictions on the tribe’s ability to prosecute. 
And while SDVCJ specifically grants jurisdiction over non-Indian abusers, 
an abuser may be able to evade jurisdiction by manipulating the elements of 
the statute or by garnering maximum advantage due solely to his race as a 
non-Indian. 
A. Manipulable Elements of Jurisdiction 
The statute conferring SDVCJ has a few requirements that must be met 
to establish tribal jurisdiction over a non-Indian. At the outset, the non-
                                                                                                             
 110. See id. at 138 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (expressing concern about the destruction 
of evidence in such situations). But see id. at 116 n.6 (majority opinion) (responding that the 
“exigent circumstances” doctrine would solve such cases). 
 111. See supra note 85. 
 112. SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 43, at 202. 
 113. Id. 
 114. See supra Section I.A.2. 
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Indian must be an intimate partner of some kind to the victim.
115
 As 
discussed in the Introduction, the statute is broad enough to cover most, if 
not all, kinds of intimate partners; in that respect, the statute is not deficient 
in my view. 
1. Territory  
One manipulable element of SDVCJ is that the act of domestic violence 
must occur on land over which the prosecuting tribe has jurisdiction. As 
each tribe is sovereign within its own territory, determining whether 
territory-based tribal jurisdiction exists can be relatively simple in large, 
mostly contiguous land areas such as Navajo Country in New Mexico. But 
in most circumstances, deciding whether tribal jurisdiction exists can be 
quite thorny.  
In 1887, during a period of immense hostility towards Indians in the 
United States, Congress passed the General Allotment Act, which allowed 
non-Indians to purchase “unused” parcels of land, even within tribal 
territory.
116
 Over the years, Congress and the president have terminated 
tribal recognition, diminished reservation area, or disestablished a 
reservation and removed Indians to another place (often Oklahoma, which 
used to be called “Indian Territory”).
117
 As a result, Indians have control 
over far less territory than they once did. To make matters worse, the 
Supreme Court held that even if tribes repurchase land within the four 
corners of the reservation from non-Indians who owned it in fee simple, due 




Despite a broad definition of “Indian country” in the statute,
119
 these 
legislative, executive, and judicial acts of oppression on tribes have caused 
                                                                                                             
 115. 25 U.S.C. § 1304(a)(2) (providing that the non-Indian must be a “current or former 
spouse or intimate partner of the victim, by a person with whom the victim shares a child in 
common, by a person who is cohabitating with or has cohabitated with the victim as a 
spouse or intimate partner, or by a person similarly situated to a spouse of the victim under 
the domestic- or family- violence laws of an Indian tribe that has jurisdiction over the Indian 
country where the violence occurs”); id. § 1304(a)(1) (covering dating violence). 
 116. See PEVAR, supra note 1, at 8–10. 
 117. Id. at 75–76 (discussing various mechanisms of federal power over Indian land); id. 
at 264–67 (discussing the unique status of Oklahoma). 
 118. See City of Sherrill v. Oneida Indian Nation, 544 U.S. 197 (2005). 
 119. 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a)–(c) (“[T]he term ‘Indian country’, as used in this chapter, 
means (a) all land within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the 
United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including rights-
of-way running through the reservation, (b) all dependent Indian communities within the 
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Indian Country to be marked by odd boundaries, significantly varying in 
size, and “checkerboarded”
120
 within such territories. While all lands within 
the boundaries of the reservation will be considered “Indian country,”
121
 
some checkerboarding exists outside of reservations, such that individual 
Indians may own property in fee simple that is Indian Country but which is 


























Because reservations vary significantly in size and may border non-
Indian land or Indian Country over which a tribe has no jurisdiction, a 
defendant may be able to evade tribal prosecution simply by being a good 
                                                                                                             
borders of the United States whether within the original or subsequently acquired territory 
thereof, and whether within or without the limits of a state, and (c) all Indian allotments, the 
Indian titles to which have not been extinguished, including rights-of-way running through 
the same.”). 
 120. PEVAR, supra note 1, at 98–99. 
 121. 18 U.S.C. § 1151(a). 
 122. Land Tenure Issues, INDIAN LAND TENURE FOUND., https://iltf.org/land-issues/ 
issues (last visited Oct. 4, 2020). 
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traveler. Some reservations are only a few miles wide, making flight across 
boundaries, or asserting a defense to jurisdiction based on sowing doubt 
























There are a few harms within the domestic violence movement that this 
patchwork evokes. First, SDVCJ’s territory-based jurisdictional limitation 
again ignores that domestic violence is not a series of discrete acts but a 
pattern of power and control. A non-Indian who strikes his Indian girlfriend 
commits an act of domestic violence that the victim’s tribe has a sovereign 
interest in deterring. It is not less of an offense against the tribe just because 
it occurs a mile or two outside of Indian Country. Restrictions on 
jurisdiction that may have a rational basis in other areas of the law can seem 
arbitrary in the domestic violence context.
125
 For example, a victim might 
                                                                                                             
 123. For a list of reservations by land area, see List of Indian Reservations in the United 
States, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_Indian_reservations_in_the_ 
United_States [https://perma.cc/CB2H-8KZS] (Nov. 7, 2020, 00:13 UTC) (showing 186 
tribal reservation areas with ten square miles or less). 
 124. Oklahoma Tribal Statistical Area, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/ 
wiki/Oklahoma_Tribal_Statistical_Area [https://perma.cc/J524-AJNQ] (Aug. 29, 2020, 
15:38 UTC).  
 125. See, e.g., Kaye & Knipps, supra note 78 (“The basic outlines of our criminal justice 
system—including what we expect courts to do and how we expect them to do it—were 
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not be entitled to a protective order if an abuser had never stepped foot in 
the state. The domestic violence movement has worked to change this status 
quo,
126
 but SDVCJ has the effect of restoring this antiquated idea that harm 
only occurs in discrete places. Because of a focus on particular incidents of 
violence, only one tribe may be able to prosecute for each incident, 
resulting in multiple, non-joinable trials at great expense to each individual 
tribe. As detailed above, this compounds burdens on the victim to cooperate 
with law enforcement and testify as if it is her responsibility, rather than the 
state’s, to protect herself. A common public judgment about victims is 
something along the lines of “why do these women stay?”
127
 But the 
checkerboard may make it literally impossible to leave or to secure justice 
against an abuser even with help from local authorities. 
A second harm from this territorial patchwork is the historical 
abandonment of Indian communities nationwide. Disclaiming responsibility 
for non-Indian crimes against Indian women due to jurisdictional hurdles is 
reminiscent of governments’ total abandonment of Indian communities 
until the harm became egregious. In United States v. Deegan, the dissenting 
judge on the Eighth Circuit added an appendix in an attempt to “lift[] the 
curtain on assaults against women and children in Indian country.”
128
 The 
Deegan dissent and other awareness-boosting decisions helped catalyze 
passage of SDVCJ three years later, but it is shortsighted to assume that 
granting tribes criminal jurisdiction only over their own territory would 
comprehensively address the broader context of domestic violence within 
tribal lands. Without a more nuanced discussion of how domestic violence 
relationships operate, tribal communities will not be better enabled to 
prevent domestic violence in the future. 
2. Ties 
Another requirement for jurisdiction is that the non-Indian have certain 
“ties” to the prosecuting tribe. These “ties” exist only if the defendant 
“resides in the Indian country of the participating tribe[,]” “is employed in 
                                                                                                             
formed long before domestic violence was recognized as an act deserving criminal sanction. 
Not surprisingly, a system built on the model of offenses against strangers may falter when 
applied to crimes that occur in the context of intimate human relationships.”). 
 126. See, e.g., Rios v. Fergusan, 978 A.2d 592 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2008) (holding that 
threats over the internet were sufficient to constitute personal jurisdiction over an abuser 
who had never entered Connecticut). 
 127. SCHECHTER, supra note 40, at 16. 
 128. 605 F.3d 625, 662–65 (8th Cir. 2010) (Bright, C.J., dissenting). Part of lifting this 
curtain involved providing harrowing statistics about abuse that occurs on Indian lands as 
well as the government’s failure to remedy these harms. 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2021
240 AMERICAN INDIAN LAW REVIEW [Vol. 45 
 
 
the Indian country of the participating tribe[,]” or is in a qualifying 
relationship with “a member of the participating tribe” or “an Indian who 
resides in the Indian country of the participating tribe.”
129
 Note that, while 
the qualifying relationship prong will allow jurisdiction over many 
perpetrators, there are plenty of gaps depending on the tribal ties of the 
victim. 
As a doctrinal matter, it may seem commonplace, even desirable, to 
require a connection between the prosecuting tribe and the accused. As a 
practical matter, however, the abuser can manipulate this requirement. First, 
because the relevant portion of SDVCJ contains only the present tense 
(“resides,” “is employed”),
130
 strict textualists may be unwilling to read in 
jurisdiction over defendants if the defendants no longer meet the 
jurisdictional requirements at the time of charging or trial. An abuser could 
simply quit his job if charged under subsection (B)(ii).
131
 This may seem 
like a losing argument to some criminal procedure experts, but it is by no 
means beyond the realm of argumentation given the presumption against 





 Indeed, some defendants have evaded tribal 
court jurisdictional requirements by taking themselves out of the precise 
statutory language. For instance, in Las Vegas Tribe of Paiute Indians v. 
Phebus, the defendant capitalized on the political identity requirement of 
being an Indian by “disenrolling” from the tribe.
134
 The tribal court found 
this to vitiate jurisdiction, and the district court tenuously agreed with the 
reasoning, finding that proof of the defendant’s identity as an Indian was an 
element that had to be proven to a jury beyond a reasonable doubt.
135
 
The ability of the abuser to manipulate facts represents a dimension of 
the battering experience that is familiar to victims: gaslighting and 
minimization.
136
 While this is no doubt a valid defense strategy,
137
 the effect 
                                                                                                             
 129. 25 U.S.C. § 1304(b)(4)(B). 
 130. Id. 
 131. See id. § 1304(b)(4)(B)(ii). 
 132. Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191 (1978). 
 133. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544 (1981). 
 134. 5 F. Supp. 3d 1221, 1225–26 (D. Nev. 2014). 
 135. Id. at 1230, 1237. 
 136. See Power & Control Wheel, supra note 45. 
 137. But see CAROLYN C. HARTLEY & ROXANN RYAN, PROSECUTION STRATEGIES IN 
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE FELONIES: TELLING THE STORY OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, EXECUTIVE 
SUMMARY 9–11 (1998), https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/194074.pdf (remarking 
that defense strategies to prosecution for domestic violence crimes often involve 
“manipulat[ing] many common abuse dynamics and myths about domestic violence,” 
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on victims feels obfuscating and punitive; a victim being told by tribal 
prosecutors that her abuser is not employed in the Indian Country where the 
violence occurred, but was employed there days before, feels like a cruel 
trick by the justice system. Much like courts that were not receptive to 
certain kinds of claims about domestic violence, in divorce and family 
proceedings, for instance, the forum in which a perpetrator is likely to face 
reprimand may affect whether a victim seeks help.
138
 
Second, this jurisdictional limitation allows domestic violence to occur 
with impunity anywhere off the home turf. If an abuser and his Indian 
spouse live and work on a particular reservation, abuse that occurs on 
another reservation would not be prosecutable by either tribe.
139
 This 
scenario may seem unrealistic, given that domestic violence is often 
conducted in the home
140
 and because abusers do not often think they are 
doing anything wrong,
141
 and therefore would be unlikely to evade 
jurisdiction so intentionally. However, remember that the line between 
Indian Country and non-Indian land may be wafer-thin; rather than being 
marked by bridge or tunnel or billboard, the lines between reservations in 
rural areas may not be marked at all, and the totality of the reservation just a 
few miles in length.
142
 On a series of errands, the couple could enter and 
exit Indian Country a dozen times. Intent to evade jurisdiction is therefore 
not necessary; loss of jurisdiction can happen by walking down the street. 
Moreover, incidents outside the home are more likely to be witnessed by 
outsiders and thus have a higher likelihood of being noticed and stopped by 
law enforcement in the moment. The fact that these incidents are less likely 
to be prosecuted because of jurisdictional reasons makes help seem all the 
less attainable to victims. 
B. Explicit Racial Distinctions 
Another distinction SDVCJ makes with regard to perpetrators is race. 
Explicit racial distinctions, when it comes to Indian law, are permissible, 
                                                                                                             
including isolation as a means of preserving privacy, normalization of abusive relationships, 
minimization to avoid responsibility, and character assassination). 
 138. See supra notes 78–79 and accompanying text (discussing how public perception of 
fairness is critical to victims’ willingness to come forward). 
 139. See 25 U.S.C. § 1304(b)(4)(B) (providing that a defendant must have statutorily 
defined “ties” to the prosecuting tribe). 
 140. In one study, 86.2% of reported domestic violence incidents took place in a 
residential setting. See FRIDAY ET AL., supra note 54, at 31. 
 141. See ADAMS, supra note 91, at 26–32 (noting that abusers often make excuses for 
their violent behavior). 
 142. See supra fig. 2. 
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despite the Fourteenth Amendment and reverse-incorporation of its 
mandate to the federal government.
143
 Categorization as an “Indian” in 
statutes is viewed as a political classification, not a racial classification;
144
 
this distinction serves the Indian community well, and I do not argue that it 
should be overturned. But Congress, concerned that tribal courts will not 
serve a minimum quantum of justice against non-Indians, has imposed 
several requirements on tribes when they exercise SDVCJ. Some of these 
requirements come from the Tribal Law and Order Act of 2010 (TLOA),
145
 
but the 2013 VAWA went above and beyond the requirements of TLOA 
when non-Indians are prosecuted.
146
 Some of these additional protections 
include the right to free counsel for indigent defendants;
147
 the right to a 
jury consisting of a cross-section of the community, including non-
Indians;
148
 a maximum penalty of three years’ incarceration;
149
 and the right 




1. Minimization of the Severity of Harm 
As a matter of societal concern for the rights of criminal defendants, 
these protections undoubtedly constitute a positive development. But as a 
matter of domestic violence law and policy, non-Indian abusers garner 
more protections than Indians when prosecuted for the same offense.
151
 
Historically, the law downplayed or minimized the harm of domestic 
violence, and advocates fought long battles to make sure serious legal 
sanctions and societal opprobrium attached to violent conduct towards 
women. Here, the law mirrors ancient harms by providing enhanced 
protections to certain abusers by imposing a cap on sentencing. For 
instance, a man who beats his wife so severely that she falls into a coma 
                                                                                                             
 143. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974). 
 144. Id. at 553 n.24. 
 145. Pub. L. No. 111-211, 124 Stat. 2258 (2010). 
 146. Violence Against Women Reauthorization Act of 2013, Pub. L. No. 113-4, 127 Stat. 
54. 
 147. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 1304(d)(2); 1302(c)(2). 
 148. 25 U.S.C. § 1304(d)(3).  
 149. Id. § 1304(d)(2), (a)(7)(C). 
 150. Id. § 1304(e). 
 151. For an analysis of the interests at play, see Margaret H. Zhang, Note, Special 
Domestic Violence Criminal Jurisdiction for Indian Tribes: Inherent Tribal Sovereignty 
Versus Defendants’ Complete Constitutional Rights, 164 U. PA. L. REV. 243 (2015). Zhang 
argues that tribal sovereignty is inherently in tension with granting the same rights to non-
Indian defendants as are available under the federal Constitution. See id. at 244–45. 
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would be prosecutable by the tribe only if the tribe was willing to settle for 
a maximum punishment of three years of imprisonment.
152
 To those who 
would say the federal government should get involved with such a major 
crime, the retort is that they simply do not; federal prosecutors declined to 




2. Minimization of the Role of Race 
A second harm is that explicit racial benefits for non-Indians reinforce 
the notion, which domestic violence advocates work to counteract, that 
domestic violence is not a white person’s problem. By requiring Indian 
abusers to submit to fates that reflect the judgment of the community as a 
whole, but allowing non-Indians fewer charges and lesser sentences 
stemming from convictions, SDVCJ unwittingly brands domestic violence 
as a “tribal territory” problem rather than as a problem that is inherently 
racial. According to referral statistics, white male violence against Indian 
females is far more prevalent than any other kind of violence within tribal 
territory,
154
 yet white males can far more easily escape jurisdiction through 
provisions explicitly built into the law out of an unfounded concern that 
tribal courts lack order and sophistication.
155
 As Kimberle Crenshaw 
cogently explains: 
Among the most troubling political consequences of the failure 
of antiracist and feminist discourses to address the intersections 
of race and gender is the fact that, to the extent they can forward 
the interest of “people of color” and “women,” respectively, one 
analysis often implicitly denies the validity of the other. The 
failure of feminism to interrogate race means that the resistance 
                                                                                                             
 152. 25 U.S.C. § 1302(b) (“A tribal court may subject a defendant to a term of 
imprisonment greater than 1 year but not to exceed 3 years for any 1 offense . . . .”). 
 153. See DOJ DECLINATION STATISTICS, supra note 18, at 3. 
 154. This inference is not directly supported by statistical evidence, but there is a mass of 
information demonstrating the prevalence of crime on Indian victims by white men that 
certainly seems to support this circumstantially. See ROSAY, supra note 3, at 24; RONET 
BACHMAN ET AL., VIOLENCE AGAINST AMERICAN INDIAN AND ALASKA NATIVE WOMEN AND 
THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE RESPONSE: WHAT IS KNOWN 38 (2008), https://www.ncjrs.gov/ 
pdffiles1/nij/grants/223691.pdf. 
 155. For instance, the passage of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968, which guarantees 
Indian defendants some of the rights guaranteed to non-Indians by virtue of the federal 
Constitution, was motivated in part by a view that tribal courts were “puppets of the 
government and issued biased decisions” and tribal officials were “tyrannical and biased”. 
See PEVAR, supra note 1, at 241–43. 
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strategies of feminism will often replicate and reinforce the 
subordination of people of color, and the failure of antiracism to 
interrogate patriarchy means that antiracism will frequently 
reproduce the subordination of women. These mutual elisions 
present a particularly difficult political dilemma for women of 
color. Adopting either analysis constitutes a denial of a 
fundamental dimension of our subordination and precludes the 




In the context of non-Indian defendants receiving more favorable 
treatment, ignoring the intersectionality of domestic violence is an ongoing 
harm because it minimizes the role that race plays in the continuing 
problem of domestic violence on tribal lands. Crenshaw’s warning is 
prescient: SDVCJ presents this “difficult political dilemma for women of 
color” by forcing women to choose between protection of their physical 
selves as victims or embracing their political subordination to white men in 
the criminal justice system.
157
 
III. Limitations Based on the Identity of the Victim 
A final key component of SDVCJ is that the victim must be an Indian.
158
 
While this is often an uncontested matter in a domestic violence 
prosecution, several scenarios may emerge that harm Indian victims. 
A. Forced Identity as Victim 
Identifying oneself as an Indian victim may seem like a matter of course, 
but determining who is an “Indian” actually changes dramatically with the 
circumstances. Whether a person is an Indian has sociological, ethnological, 
and political components. For U.S. Census purposes, holding yourself out 
as a sociological Indian makes you one.
159
 Ethnologically, an Indian is 
simply a descendant of one of the people native to the Americas, which 
may be shown through a simple blood test.
160
 Politically, each sovereign—
                                                                                                             
 156. Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and 
Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1252 (1991). 
 157. Id. 
 158. 25 U.S.C. § 1304(b)(4)(A). 
 159. JACK UTTER, AMERICAN INDIANS: ANSWERS TO TODAY’S QUESTIONS 25 (2d ed. 
2001).  
 160. See PEVAR, supra note 1, at 17–18. 
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the federal government, as well as each of the federally recognized tribes—
defines for itself what makes someone a member of the tribe.
161
 
To make matters worse, the federal government has multiple definitions 
for different purposes, which are not consistent from one statute and 
regulation to the next.
162
 Tribes may require registration with the tribe, 
proof that an individual has a particular quantum of Indian blood (one-
fourth, for example), or proof that an individual is a direct descendant of 
someone on the “tribe’s original membership tribal roll” from the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
163
 Courts may apply different tests, 
but in criminal cases, prosecutors must prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, 
the race of a person whose identity is necessary to establish jurisdiction.
164
 
1. Mixed-Race Women and Victimhood Identity 
As a result, an individual may be an “Indian” for some purposes but not 
others. Women of mixed ancestry may hold themselves out as Indian 
                                                                                                             
 161. Id.  
 162. See Vince Two Eagles, What Is an Indian? A Legal Definition, Part 1, P’SHIP WITH 
NATIVE AMS. (Dec. 6, 2011), http://blog.nativepartnership.org/what-is-an-indian-a-legal-
definition-part-1. The federal government’s general definition from the 1934 Indian 
Reorganization Act is quite broad, and includes 
all persons of Indian descent who are members of any recognized Indian tribe 
now under Federal jurisdiction, and all persons who are descendants of such 
members who were, on June 1, 1934, residing within the present boundaries of 
any Indian reservation, and shall further include all other persons of one-half or 
more Indian blood. 
25 U.S.C. § 5129. This is generally a good thing, as it determines eligibility for certain 
federal benefits available only to Indians. However, the definition does not set a floor, and 
therefore leaves it to the courts to determine who may count as an Indian in other contexts, 
such as criminal jurisdiction. See COHEN, supra note 10, § 3.03[4], at 176–79; United States 
v. Maggi, 598 F.3d 1073, 1078–81 (9th Cir. 2010) (requiring both “tribal or government 
recognition” and at least some blood quantum); cf. United States v. Rogers, 45 U.S. (1 
How.) 567 (1846) (Taney, C.J.) (holding that an adult white man who had joined the 
Cherokee Tribe and was accepted as a member of the Tribe could not be an “Indian” for 
criminal jurisdiction purposes because he did not have Indian blood). For more context on 
different views of what makes an “Indian,” see Allison M. Dussias, Geographically-Based 
and Membership-Based Views of Indian Tribal Sovereignty: The Supreme Court’s Changing 
Vision, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1993). 
 163. See PEVAR, supra note 1, at 91. 
 164. See, e.g., United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2005) (holding that a 
woman successfully proved her affirmative defense that she was an Indian and therefore not 
subject to prosecution by the federal government for choking her five-year-old child); Las 
Vegas Tribe of Paiute Indians v. Phebus, 5 F. Supp. 3d 1221 (D. Nev. 2014) (holding that 
the tribe must submit to the jury the question of whether the defendant is an Indian). 
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among Indian communities and as white among white communities for 
some recognizable social objective, such as to take advantage of certain 
rights available only from tribal enrollment, avoid discrimination, or to 
change how they identify over time.
165
 Women of mixed Indian ancestry 
may be enrolled only with one of many tribes they would be eligible to 
enroll in or feel more strongly associated with one tribe than another despite 
ancestry in multiple.
166
 While this fact would not necessarily obviate 
SDVCJ, the fragility of SDVCJ on an eventual appeal to a federal court 
may cause prosecutors to think twice about pursuing a case where the 




Requiring proof of identity as a condition of victimhood in order for their 
abuser to be held accountable should remind the reader of harms previously 
encountered. Identity is frequently complex; the pitfalls facing mixed-race 
                                                                                                             
 165. See Carolyn A. Liebler et al., America’s Churning Races: Race and Ethnic 
Response Changes Between Census 2000 and the 2010 Census 25 ((U.S. Census Bureau, 
No. 2014-09, 2014), https://www.census.gov/content/dam/Census/library/working-papers/ 
2014/adrm/carra-wp-2014-09.pdf (noting “substantial single-race-to-single-race response 
change between white and American Indian, again with complementary, countervailing 
flows” between decennial census records); D’Vera Cohn, American Indian and White, but 
Not ‘Multiracial,’ PEW RESEARCH CTR. (June 11, 2015), https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-
tank/2015/06/11/american-indian-and-white-but-not-multiracial (noting the remarkable 
fluidity in racial identity that Indians have as a group). As an astute reader will recall, 
Senator Elizabeth Warren recently faced a massive public outcry for (correctly) identifying 
herself as having at most one-sixty-fourth Indian blood. See Jonathan Martin, Elizabeth 
Warren’s DNA Results Draw Rebuke from Trump and Raise Questions, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 
15, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/15/us/politics/elizabeth-warren-dna-ancestry. 
html. This blood quantum and the fact that she held herself out as an Indian as a professor at 
some point in the past, with almost certain ancestors in Oklahoma in 1934, might actually 
allow her to be an Indian under some federal definitions, and possibly in some tribes that 
require only proof of ancestry, see supra note 162, but fails to meet a more culturally 
accepted definition. 
 166. See Cohn, supra note 165 (noting that sixty-three percent of self-identified 
multiracial American Indians specified a tribe with which they were associated). 
 167. See, for example, the discussions about political and ethnological identity of 
individual Indian defendants in United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2005), and 
Las Vegas Tribe of Paiute Indians v. Phebus, 5 F. Supp. 3d 1221 (D. Nev. 2014), mentioned 
supra note 164. Note that Indian victims do not necessarily have to be members of the 
prosecuting tribe, but there are still some restrictions. If the defendant does not live or work 
on the reservations, “[a] participating tribe may exercise special domestic violence criminal 
jurisdiction over a defendant only if the defendant . . . is a spouse, intimate partner, or dating 
partner of—(I) a member of the participating tribe; or (II) an Indian who resides in the 
Indian country of the participating tribe.” 25 U.S.C. § 1304(b)(4)(B) (emphasis added). 
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victims operating in SDVCJ epitomize Kimberle Crenshaw’s essential 
thesis that intersectional identities can form the basis for the perpetration of 
further harm.
168
 Even when taking domestic violence seriously, 
governments’ “failure . . . to interrogate race means that the resistance 
strategies of feminism will often replicate and reinforce the subordination 
of people of color.”
169
 As a result, “[t]he political interests of women of 
color are obscured and sometimes jeopardized by political strategies that 
ignore or suppress intersectional issues.”
170
 SDVCJ crystallizes this 
dynamic with eerie precision: every day jurisdiction is limited by the race 
of the victim is a day that forces mixed-race victims into a position 
subordinate to that of other-race women. 
2. Mixed-Race Women and Political Identity 
It is a futile effort to attempt to disentangle mixed-race victims’ identities 
as Indians from the political context of tribal sovereignty. Advocates who 
seek to dismantle this component of SDVCJ for its harmful effect on 
mixed-race women risk tremendous backlash from tribal communities who 
have long fought for a more robust concept of tribal sovereignty. In this 
way, SDVCJ echoes Crenshaw’s supporting argument that “[w]ithin 
communities of color, efforts to stem the politicization of domestic violence 
are often grounded in attempts to maintain the integrity of the community”; 
this dynamic forces people of color to “weigh their interests in avoiding 
issues that might reinforce distorted public perceptions” and absorb “the 
cost of suppression” as incidental to their victimhood.
171
 If you are a mixed-
race Indian, you are worthy of the tribe’s protection only if you ignore half 
your identity; if you are a mixed-race non-Indian, take your case to the local 
state prosecutor for help. The Catch-22 is in the quantum of your blood and 
therefore beyond your control. 
An abuser could capitalize on the victim’s mixed identity by suggesting 
that the victim is “not Indian enough.” Emotional abuse of this sort—
sowing confusion in the victim’s sense of self, gaslighting, humiliating, and 
minimizing self-worth—is a common tactic used to control a victim. By 
denying the victim her sense of self, the abuser also puts the blame for his 
own situation on the victim. That is, if she were not an Indian, the tribal 
court proceeding would go away; by convincing the victim that she is not 
an Indian, the abuser evades reprimand. Asserting that a mixed-race victim 
                                                                                                             
 168. See Crenshaw, supra note 156, at 1252. 
 169. Id.  
 170. Id.  
 171. Id. at 1255–56. 
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is not Indian as a defense to prosecution is the jurisprudential equivalent of 
a common refrain of abusers: “it’s your fault.”
172
 
B. Forced Identity as Witness or Litigant 
The effect of a victim’s declaring herself as Indian or not Indian may 
have consequences far outside the individual case and even far outside the 
justice system. One salient example is, again, the Confrontation Clause. As 
a witness, a victim is likely to face vigorous cross-examination on the stand. 
As identity matters are particularly intricate, mixed-race victims may be 
subject to being probed on all of the ways she has ever held herself out as 
non-Indian, whether on credit card applications or social media accounts or 
at cocktail parties. Such accosting could easily be enough to deter her from 
coming forward in the first place, recalling the post-Crawford difficulties of 
prosecuting domestic violence cases.
173
 While Indian defendants are not 
necessarily entitled to the same level of confrontation as in Crawford, as 
this right is only codified in a 1968 statute that does not have to be 
interpreted the same as constitutional rights,
174
 non-Indian defendants have 




This conundrum may also affect a subsequent or concurrent civil case. If 
a prosecuting tribal jury found beyond a reasonable doubt that a mixed-race 
victim was an Indian, would collateral estoppel preclude her from asserting 
that she is non-Indian for some other purpose? In civil cases, the Supreme 
Court has increasingly turned to a totality-of-the-circumstances approach to 
determining whether tribal court jurisdiction exists.
176
 Sometimes, the 
determination can turn on the identity of a single party, such as the driver of 
a car in an accident occurring on tribal lands.
177
 Thus, the victim may be 
                                                                                                             
 172. See Power & Control Wheel, supra note 45. 
 173. See Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford, 91 VA. L. REV. 747 
(2005). 
 174. 25 U.S.C. § 1302. 
 175. Id. § 1304(d)(4). 
 176. See Strate v. A-1 Contractors, 520 U.S. 438, 442 (1997) (holding that a non-Indian 
who had five Indian children and was the widow of a tribal member could not maintain an 
action in tribal court even though the accident occurred on tribal lands); Montana v. United 
States, 450 U.S. 544, 565–66 (1981) (holding that an Indian tribe could not exercise civil 
jurisdiction over a non-Indian on non-Indian land, even on the reservation, unless the tribe 
could prove either a “consensual relationship[]” with the tribe or the non-Indian is engaged 
in some activity that threatens or directly affects “the political integrity, the economic 
security, or the health or welfare of the tribe”). 
 177. See Strate, 520 U.S. at 442. 
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deterred from bringing a simple civil suit against her abuser—a commonly 
available remedy against assaulters
178
—in tandem or after a tribal 
prosecution. In an even more disturbing scenario, if a jury found beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the victim was not Indian, would the victim then be 
denied certain federal benefits only available to Indians because of federal 
preclusion rules? Would she suddenly become subject to state taxation?  
This point recalls the idea that domestic violence must be understood in 
its broader political context to be effectively eradicated.
179
 Even if a 
prosecution successfully ended the domestic violence between an Indian 
victim and her abuser—the central goal of the domestic violence 
movement, in a limited sense—the prosecution or other events within the 
justice system may impede the victim from regaining her autonomy in the 
future or may disable other forms of justice. 
C. Forced Identity as Defendant 
A final manner in which SDVCJ harms victims is in the unusual but 
vexing cases where a domestic violence victim is also a defendant. Because 
of the patchwork of jurisdiction based on the race of the perpetrator and the 
victim, a mixed-race victim pursuing a criminal case against her abuser in 
coordination with tribal prosecutors has a significant incentive to identify as 
an Indian. At the same time, if she is prosecuted for attacking her non-
Indian abuser, she is placed in the position of making the difficult choice of 
how to identify. If she does not have tribal enrollment, she would have a 
foolproof defense to identify as non-Indian, so as to force the tribal court 
out of jurisdiction and hope that the state—which has jurisdiction over non-
Indians who commit crimes against non-Indians
180
—declines to prosecute. 
This reality may also force the abuser to go free from tribal custody.  
On the other hand, the victim may be incentivized to identify as an 
Indian to retain the good graces and typically lower punishments imposed 
by her own tribe. In other words, some mixed-race victims who are also 
prosecuted for attacks on their abuser must choose between being 
prosecuted along with their abuser in tribal court or giving her abuser the 
                                                                                                             
 178. It was not always this way. See Siegel, supra note 58, at 2162–70 (discussing 
interspousal tort immunity and official denial of civil damages claims without the husband’s 
joinder). 
 179. See, e.g., Wini Breines & Linda Gordon, The New Scholarship on Family Violence, 
8 SIGNS 490, 492 (1983) (“[A]ll violence must be seen in the context of wider power 
relations . . . . [V]iolence cannot be accurately viewed as a set of isolated events but must be 
placed in an entire social context.”). 
 180. See United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621, 624 (1881). 
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key to the handcuffs in exchange for her own freedom. Though no such 
cases have reached a federal court’s docket since VAWA’s enactment, 
some criminal cases turn completely on whether the defendant is an 
Indian.
181
 It is only a matter of time before courts must confront this mare’s 
nest. 
Once a woman appears in the tribal court as a defendant, the abuser has 
numerous arrows in his quiver. Given that many tribes have strong family-
dependence traditions and family networks,
182
 an abuser has an incentive to 
exploit this fact to gain sympathy for his own misdeeds. He can manipulate 
tribal concepts of interdependence, in which extended family members or 
friends help to raise a child, to paint the victim-defendant as unable to care 
for her children alone.
183
 Even if this argument was not persuasive to 
finders of fact in the victim’s criminal proceeding, it could still have 
damaging psychological effects on her and deter her from coming forward 
on any domestic violence cases in the future. Additionally, an acquittal by 
an Indian factfinder on such grounds, when the abuser has painted her as a 
bad mother, could damage public perceptions about the justice received in 
tribal courts and ultimately hinder tribal sovereignty efforts nationwide.
184
 
The experience of a woman simultaneously as victim and defendant, 
caught between a rock and a hard place in how to proceed—in her home 
forum and among her tribal community, no less—echoes the experience of 
battered women in the cycle of violence.
185
 During what scholars have 
dubbed the “tension-building phase” of a common domestic violence 
                                                                                                             
 181. See, e.g., United States v. Bruce, 394 F.3d 1215 (9th Cir. 2005). 
 182. For instance, some tribal members may leave their young children with extended 
family members for months at a time in order to develop stronger family relationships. See 
supra note 42; see also, e.g., Benjamin Grant Purzycki, Comparison of the Traditional and 
Contemporary Extended Family Units of the Hopi and Lakota (Sioux): A Study of the 
Deterioration of Kinship Structures and Functions, 19 NEB. ANTHROPOLOGIST 16, 18 (2004) 
(remarking that “[s]isters are responsible for each other’s children and share all of the labor” 
in Hopi families). 
 183. Cf. SCHNEIDER ET AL., supra note 43, at 623 (discussing the Catch-22 of a woman 
leaving with her children and facing child kidnapping charges and adverse custody 
presumptions, leaving without her children and suffering adverse custody presumptions, or 
staying and remaining vulnerable to continued abuse). 
 184. Public perception of lawlessness on tribal lands has traditionally been, and still is, a 
major impetus for legislative action. See Goldberg, supra note 17, at 541 (discussing the 
perception of “lawlessness” as motivating the passage of Public Law 280); PEVAR, supra 
note 1, at 79, 112, 242 (discussing perceptions of lawlessness on Indian lands that spurred 
the passage of the Major Crimes Act, Public Law 280, and ICRA, respectively). 
 185. LENORE E. WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE: WHY BATTERED WOMEN KILL AND HOW 
SOCIETY RESPONDS 42–54 (1989). 
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relationship, women often feel restricted by a set of arbitrarily imposed and 
enforced “rules” of the house.
186
 Efforts to avoid breaking these rules are 
futile, even when walking on eggshells to avoid angering the abuser.
187
 The 
victim’s inability to predict when the next manifestation of acute violence 
will occur spurs the development of “learned helplessness”—a “lack of 
ability to predict the efficacy of one’s own behavior.”
188
 Similarly, a victim 
facing prosecution in tribal court is unable to properly protect herself 
without subjecting herself to a countervailing harm. She risks further abuse, 
dilution of her own identity,
189
 and weakened ties with her community
190
 at 
the hands of her abuser to evade prosecution; alternatively, she risks self-
flagellation by subjecting herself to both the sword and the aegis of the 
tribal court. This injustice exists only because of the narrow scope of 
SDVCJ. 
IV. Potential Solutions 
Having discussed multiple manners in which SDVCJ unintentionally 
embodies harms it is meant to combat, I will now address potential 
solutions. At the outset of this discussion, I will lay out a few caveats. First, 
as the persistence of domestic violence rates stymieing scholars and 
advocates demonstrates, there is likely no silver bullet that will solve all of 
the problems inherent in a system for combatting domestic violence. 
Second, the complexities and expense of SDVCJ may explain why very few 
tribes have actually taken advantage of it. As a result, any of the problems I 
have described above are generally contained to a handful of prosecuting 
tribes around the country, and there is time to enact amended legislation to 
head off problems before more tribes consider employing SDVCJ. Finally, 
despite the many problems surrounding SDVCJ, it is important to keep in 
mind that, in the decades leading up to its enactment, the conditions for 
                                                                                                             
 186. See Fischer et al., supra note 51, at 2126–37, 2128 n.56 (discussing the culture of 
“rules” in abusive households). 
 187. See id. at 2126–37, 2170. 
 188. WALKER, supra note 185, at 50; see also id. at 49–53 (describing “learned 
helplessness” generally). 
 189. See Fischer et al., supra note 51, at 2132 (“It is undoubtedly easier to control 
someone if they think less of themselves.”). 
 190. Isolation is a common tactic of abuse. See Power & Control Wheel, supra note 45; 
see also Fischer et al., supra note 51, at 2132 (“Limiting victims’ interactions with other 
people enhances the batterers’ domination over the family by both cutting off potential 
sources of support and by making the boundary between the family culture of battering and 
the outside world more defined.”). 
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domestic violence victims on Indian reservations could scarcely get worse; 
any expansion of accountability for non-Indian defendants is a positive 
development. Considering these caveats, a number of solutions with 
inherent advantages and disadvantages exist. 
A. Restore Oliphant 
First, a simple solution is to eliminate tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians 
and restore Oliphant, the case in which the Supreme Court ruled that a tribe 
could not prosecute a non-Indian for crimes even if they are committed on 
tribal lands.
191
 Tribes are not naturally predisposed to this option, as it 
erodes their powers of self-government. Restoring Oliphant also means a 
full reliance on federal prosecution for crimes committed by non-Indians on 
tribal lands is wholly inadequate, as pre-2013 conditions made clear.
192
 This 
solution therefore has little hope of addressing the domestic violence 
scourge on tribal lands.  
A related solution is to merely require more aggressive federal 
prosecution and law enforcement. But for many reasons beyond what this 
article can cover, forcing or even encouraging prosecutors to prosecute has 
substantial limits. In any event, dual prosecutions by tribes and the federal 
government do not trigger double jeopardy prohibitions;
193
 thus, if this is 
truly the solution, it could be implemented at any time. 
B. Overrule Oliphant Completely 
A second solution, originating with and advanced primarily by tribes 
themselves, is the total opposite: a full and complete overruling of Oliphant 
and a restoration of the principle that tribes have full sovereignty and 
criminal jurisdiction over any events that occur on tribal territory, 
regardless of the race of the defendant. Tribes would no longer have to 
worry about any jurisdictional problems except those that states must 
ordinarily endure, such as proving where the crime occurred. Just as a 
person submits to the jurisdiction of another state when traveling interstate, 
people everywhere will be on notice that they are subject to the law of the 
local tribe when they enter Indian territory. 
Unfortunately, the problems with this approach immediately surface 
upon closer examination. First, extending jurisdiction over the territory 
without regard to the race of the defendant will raise the question of 
                                                                                                             
 191. Oliphant v. Suquamish Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 212 (1978). 
 192. See generally DOJ DECLINATION STATISTICS, supra note 18 (noting that half of cases 
referred to federal prosecutors were declined). 
 193. United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313 (1978). 
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whether we must also ignore the race of the victim; otherwise, the problems 
described in Part III persist. But if the race of the victim is also ignored, it is 
not just Oliphant, but United States v. McBratney, too, that must be 
overruled.
194
 Whether Congress’s plenary power over Indian affairs extends 
to designating criminal jurisdiction between two non-Indians without 
disestablishing Indian territory altogether is a novel and difficult question. 
Second, extending jurisdiction to all non-Indian defendants regardless of 
the crime would raise the question of what kinds of protections non-Indian 
defendants must be afforded in tribal courts. The Indian Civil Rights Act
195
 
and the Tribal Law and Order Act
196
 provide statutory baselines for all 
tribal court proceedings, but they are not identical to constitutional 
protections.
197
 Meanwhile, all non-Indian criminal defendants are 
presumptively entitled to protections of the U.S. Constitution regardless of 
where they live. The potential problem posed by a non-Indian being unable 
to assert constitutional rights in a tribal court proceeding is only a non-issue 
currently because VAWA expressly requires compliance with the U.S. 
Constitution in order to exercise SDVCJ.
198
  
Reconciling these two ideas is not impossible. However, the burden of 
maintaining this type of prosecutorial system, its constitutionality, and the 
philosophical quandary of the extent to which tribes would merely become 
an extension of the U.S. Attorney’s office, by mandating a convergence of 
federal and tribal law, may make this solution a pipe dream. 
C. Formalized Referral Program 
A third solution to this issue is to establish a formal referral program 
allowing tribes to prosecute as they currently do, but with a semi-binding 
catchall: the federal government will step in whenever tribal jurisdiction is 
questionable. This solution would eliminate the incentive of defendants to 
avoid plea bargaining; even if the tribe cannot prosecute, the specter of the 
federal government’s indictment looms. A referral program would promote 
tribal sovereignty because federal prosecution would not begin until after 
the tribal prosecutor has made a decision as to whether to move forward.  
                                                                                                             
 194. See United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621 (1881) (holding that the State has 
criminal jurisdiction over a crime occurring between two non-Indians). 
 195. 25 U.S.C. § 1301. 
 196. Pub. L. No. 111-211, 124 Stat. 2258 (2010) (codified in scattered sections of 25 
U.S.C.). 
 197. See supra note 24 (discussing which rights each of these laws gives to defendants). 
 198. See 25 U.S.C. § 1304(d)(2); id. § 1302(c)(2); see also supra notes 147–50 and 
accompanying text. 
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However, this solution faces the same enforceability problems as those 
discussed in the first solution. One major reason for establishing SDVCJ 
was that federal prosecutors declined to prosecute huge numbers of cases 
that were referred to them.
199
 In fact, tribes would often refer cases 
involving non-Indian criminal activity to federal prosecutors, but it was met 
with little success. 
D. Statutory Amendment to Encompass Situational Domestic Violence 
A fourth and final solution is to establish a simple rule: any time 
domestic violence is involved, every crime related to such facts and 
circumstances may be prosecuted by the tribal court regardless of the race 
of the perpetrator or victim. That is, whenever a person has suffered 
“domestic violence” within Indian Country, then the tribe has jurisdiction. 
“Domestic violence,” here, is broadly defined as a relationship of 
domination and control, rather than a series of crimes. A 2019 bill that 
passed the House goes partly toward this solution by enumerating particular 
crimes that would be prosecutable in tribal court,
200
 but still falls short of 
the solution I propose. This solution has several advantages and 
disadvantages. 
1. Advantages 
The advantages here are numerous. First, a special criminal jurisdictional 
scheme centered on situational domestic violence embodies the notion that 
domestic violence is not just a set of discrete crimes, but rather a systematic 
and continuous exertion of power and control over another. Prosecutors 
would not be limited by the kinds of crimes they could charge so long as the 
crime occurs in the broader context of domestic violence. The use of 
emotional or economic abuse—unlawfully controlling a woman’s access to 
money by stealing her earnings, for instance—can be prosecuted under this 
solution not because a tribal or federal court must agree that a financial 
crime is necessarily a crime of domestic violence, but because domestic 
violence exists within the relationship; therefore, any crime with a 
reasonable nexus to the victim of a crime can be prosecuted within the 
tribal court. Thus, a domestic violence incident involving animal abuse, 
property damage, threats, or an assault on a tribal officer attempting to keep 
the peace
201
 could all fall well within the scope of the amended provision 
                                                                                                             
 199. See generally DOJ DECLINATION STATISTICS, supra note 18 (noting that more than 
half of cases referred to federal prosecutors were declined). 
 200. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 201. See supra Section I.A.1. 
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because the original underlying event is a domestic violence incident. 
Witness intimidation, perjury, contempt of court, and other crimes that 
trample on the integrity of the justice system would also fall within this 
scope because the crimes take place pursuant to the domestic violence 
incident, although Congress should be sure to specify that auxiliary crimes 
are included to dispel any doubts about jurisdiction.  
Indeed, some representatives of tribal communities have recently 
suggested this:  
SDVCJ would be more effective if it is amended to further 
clarify that Indian tribes possess the authority to prosecute a non-
Indian for the types of offenses that often occur in the cycle of 
domestic abuse that may or may not involve physical force, but 
are nonetheless harmful to victims.
202
 
Second, broadening the view of domestic violence gives prosecutors and 
law enforcement officers more tools to prosecute and investigate crimes 
against Indian victims.
203
 The insufficiency of plea bargaining is eliminated 
with this solution because the abuser is eligible for prosecution on multiple 
charges. Law enforcement officers would be able to investigate the scenes 
of crimes even if no active domestic violence is taking place, if the reason 
for the call to tribal police was originally domestic violence. Illegal drug 
and alcohol activity that exacerbates, contributes to, or plays some other 
role in a domestic violence dispute is also prosecutable under this theory.
204
 
Third, this expanded jurisdictional approach would unshackle tribes from 
the requirement that a victim be Indian.
205
 Such limitations are absent in 
most criminal prosecutions at the state level. So long as a crime was 
committed within a tribe’s territory and the tribe recognizes domestic 
violence as a crime within the community, the identity of the perpetrator or 
the victim does not matter except in extremely rare cases (such as with 
diplomats or entities with immunity). An offense against the tribe will be 
                                                                                                             
 202. NCAI REPORT, supra note 2, at 28. 
 203. See supra Section I.B. 
 204. Indeed, one should at least take into account the role that controlled substances play 
in domestic violence. See supra Section I.C. One scholar remarked that the first real reforms 
at combating domestic violence after Bradley v. State, 1 Miss. 156 (1824), came in the form 
of the “Temperance and Abolitionist Movements,” which denunciated both alcohol 
consumption and its connection to wife-beating. See LEE E. ROSS, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND 
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 35 (2018). For a summary of alcohol’s role on battering, see WALKER, 
supra note 185, at 114–23. 
 205. See 25 U.S.C. § 1304(B)(4)(a)(i) (2018) (providing that SDVCJ does not attach 
when neither defendant nor victim is Indian). 
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presumed in every case in which there is domestic violence, even when two 
non-Indians are involved. This fact poses similar problems to the complete 
overruling of Oliphant because it also requires an overruling of 
McBratney.
206
 However, eliminating these constraints on victim identity 
                                                                                                             
 206. See supra note 180 and accompanying text. There is considerable latitude to argue 
that McBratney should not be considered good law, or at least not for the same reasons as 
articulated in the decision itself. McBratney itself was about whether a federal district court 
had jurisdiction over a crime between two non-Indians, and so the Court did not directly 
hold that a tribe would have no jurisdiction. Indeed, it narrowed its holding to the precise 
issues: 
The single question that we do or can decide in this case is . . . whether the 
Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Colorado has jurisdiction 
of the crime of murder committed by a white man upon a white man within the 
Ute Reservation, and within the limits of the State of Colorado; . . . [T]hat 
question must be [a]nswered in the negative. 
United States v. McBratney, 104 U.S. 621, 624 (1881).  
This case was decided in the same era in which the Supreme Court took an extremely 
formalistic view of race, nationality, citizenship, and sovereignty. The year after McBratney, 
Congress passed the Chinese Exclusion Act, a notorious race-based immigration exclusion 
program, and two years after that, the Court determined that Indians could not be born 
citizens because they were not “subject to the jurisdiction” of the United States within the 
meaning of the newly ratified Fourteenth Amendment. Elk v. Wilkins, 112 U.S. 94, 102 
(1884). Armed with arbitrary and facile conceptions of what kinds of races could ever be 
citizens, the Court endeavored to draw lines, but their conclusions make the categorization 
of white-on-white crimes in Indian territory subject to state jurisdiction look obsolete. For a 
fascinating account of one such story in the early twentieth century, see Kathryn Schulz, 
Citizen Khan, NEW YORKER (May 30, 2016), https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/ 
2016/06/06/zarif-khans-tamales-and-the-muslims-of-sheridan-wyoming. In discussing the 
tumult of these race-based distinctions (which affect the McBratney analysis above), Schulz 
writes:  
[B]eginning in 1870, those petitioning for American citizenship had to be either 
black or white. 
 That left immigrants from Asian nations in the lurch—deliberately, as 
Congress soon made clear. The 1882 Chinese Exclusion Act prevented anyone 
born in China from becoming American. The Immigration Act of 1917 
established an “Asiatic Barred Zone”: a region, encompassing dozens of 
countries, from the Middle East to Melanesia, whose native citizens could not 
be naturalized. In theory, such laws were plenty clear. In practice, however, 
Asians petitioning for citizenship simply contended that they were white. 
Whether that was true was a matter of heated dispute among ethnologists, 
anthropologists, political scientists, policymakers, and government officials 
around the nation. 
 The courts, brought in to clarify the issue, made a mess of it instead. In 
“White by Law: The Legal Construction of Race,” Berkeley law professor Ian 
Haney López provides a tragicomic list of court rulings on racial identity, 
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restores the neutrality of Indian victims’ decision to come forward relative 
to other victims. 
A final advantage of this proposal is that it gives tribes the absolute right 
to prosecute depending on the circumstances, thus promoting tribal 
sovereignty and prosecutorial discretion while limiting the financial or 
administrative burdens on tribal courts. Because the proposed jurisdictional 
approach still limits prosecution to crimes having a component of domestic 
violence, there is no worry that tribes will go out to persecute non-Indians 
who commit other crimes—even serious felonies like murder, burglary, or 
arson. Although tribes will have to provide cross-section juries and free 
counsel to these non-Indian defendants, the number of cases to which this 
circumstance applies is relatively small compared to the remainder of 
tribes’ criminal justice systems and all of the costs associated with the 
protection of defendants’ rights within that system.
207
  
Moreover, tribes with limited resources can take advantage of the lower 
types of crime and identity hurdles that currently exist in SDVCJ by 
choosing whether to prosecute those crimes that they do not prioritize as 
offenses against the tribe. For instance, under this formulation, a Navajo 
tribal prosecutor might legitimately choose to decline to prosecute a white 
abuser where the event took place on Navajo land, but the victim was Hopi. 
At the same time, Navajo officials would still reserve the right to prosecute 
if the Hopi tribe, through some kind of treaty or extradition agreement, 
requested it. Under current SDVCJ rules, that possibility is foreclosed: the 
federal government must prosecute. 
2. Disadvantages 
One difficulty of this proposal is that any characterization of this sort 
may suffer from vagueness. Because domestic violence can involve a 
                                                                                                             
together with their legal rationales. Among those rulings: that Hawaiians are 
not white (based on scientific evidence); that Mexicans are not white (based on 
legal precedent); that Burmese are not white (based on common knowledge); 
that Japanese are not white (based on legal precedent); that people who are one-
quarter Japanese are not white (based on legal precedent); that Syrians are 
white (based on scientific evidence); that Syrians are not white (based on 
common knowledge); that Arabs are white (based on common knowledge); that 
Arabs are not white (based on common knowledge); that Native Americans are 
not white (based on nothing). 
Id. 
 207. Congress authorized some SDVCJ funding after the 2013 Act to assist tribes with 
implementation. See 25 U.S.C. § 1304(h) (authorizing $5 million in annual appropriations 
through Fiscal Year 2018). 
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number of crimes, someone who commits a crime any time their spouse is 
involved may conceivably be charged under this statute. We would have to 
rely on integrity of tribal prosecutors to charge only crimes within the ambit 
of domestic violence, which would require substantial legal education and 
training.  
Moreover, we may still face line-drawing problems along the margins. 
For instance, if a domestic violence abuser runs a methamphetamine 
distribution operation from his basement, but no methamphetamine was 
visible or consumed during a discrete event of domestic violence for which 
tribal officers were summoned, the methamphetamine charges may not be 
prosecutable even under the broadest definition of domestic-violence-based 
tribal jurisdiction because the charges had no conceivable connection to 
domestic violence in that moment. In some sense, this is a desirable 
limitation to conceptually distinguish the problem of domestic violence 
from the problem of crime in general. However, one may imagine scenarios 
in which the abuser manipulates the extent of other crimes’ involvement in 
his exertion of power and control over the victim. In the same regard, one 
may imagine instances in which the victim downplays the role that other 
crimes played in her own domestic violence, lest she be blamed for her own 
abuse or, worse, lest she incriminate herself.
208
 
Additionally, the limitation confining jurisdiction to domestic violence 
scenarios would pose its own problems as to other violence against women. 
For instance, even under a broad definition of “domestic violence,” sexual 
assault by “random” people or public groping and other forms of sexual 
harassment would still not be prosecutable.
209
 These types of crimes are 
arguably under the same umbrella as domestic violence, as they inflict 
similar societal damage to feminist causes and contribute to a culture of 




Finally, my proposed jurisdictional approach would not eliminate the 
trend of convergence between federal and tribal law due to the enhanced 
substantive and procedural protections afforded under SDVCJ. Because any 
proposed expansion of SDVCJ is politically unlikely to forego compliance 
with the U.S. Constitution for non-Indian defendants, the harm of treating 
                                                                                                             
 208. See supra Section III.C; see also SCHECHTER, supra note 40, at 20–27 (discussing 
victim blaming and inadequate police responses). 
 209. Some language in the new House bill would provide protections beyond intimate 
partner violence. See supra note 26 and accompanying text. 
 210. SCHECHTER, supra note 40, at 3–5, 29–34 (tracking the development of the domestic 
violence movement as a fundamentally feminist cause). 
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non-Indian abusers of Indian women more gently than Indian abusers is 
unlikely to go away, regardless of a solution that closes the jurisdictional 
gaps. 
3. Resolution 
Ultimately, this fourth solution—extending SDVCJ to encompass any 
crimes that occur in a broader context of domestic violence—is the best, 
given the current jurisdictional patchwork. While there would certainly be 
challenges related to the implementation of this solution, most of the 
challenges relate to the ambivalence of the Supreme Court in defining the 
contours of American Indian law and the capriciousness with which it 
determines defendants’ constitutional rights under the Bill of Rights.  
Because these unknowns are external to the expansion of SDVCJ, there 
is not much reason to defer action. A test of the limits of tribal sovereignty 
could make its way to the Supreme Court whether SDVCJ covers a small 
subset of non-Indian abusers or all of them. This is one situation where the 
federal government’s assertion of plenary power over Indian tribes could be 
a catalyst for sovereignty rather than a tool for oppression, as it has 
historically been used.  
Conclusion 
While much legislation has unintended consequences, not all legislation 
has consequences that mirror the harms the law intends to address. The 
numerous unintended consequences resulting from SDVCJ’s limited scope 
mimic the harms that the domestic violence movement has been working to 
remedy over the last several decades. SDVCJ is not hopeless; indeed, some 
remedial legislation is awaiting a Senate vote. But without a broad 
understanding of domestic violence and a commitment to filling the gaps 
that put American Indian women at high risk of revictimization, these 
problems will endure. Let us hope the waiting period is short. 
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